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An urban overhead? Crime, agglomeration, and amenity*

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Abstract

Using data for 134 locations in New Zealand, we study the effects of crime and agglomeration on urban amenity. We find that crime has significant negative effects on the value of urban amenity, with elasticities of approximately −0.06 for firms and −0.09 for workers. To put this effect in context, this implies the value of urban amenity for workers is approximately 2–3 times more sensitive to crime than average temperature. More uniquely, we find that controlling for crime leads to somewhat larger estimates of agglomeration economies. Together, these results suggest that crime detracts significantly from the value of urban amenity and may also act as an urban congestion cost that serves to undermine agglomeration economies.

Keywords: crime, urban development, agglomeration economies, amenity, New Zealand

JEL-classification: R21, R31, C11.

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1 Introduction

We study the effects of crime and agglomeration on the value of urban amenity. In doing so, we add to a body of economic literature that harks back to Becker (1968), where individual decisions to commit crimes respond to expected private benefits and costs. A growing strand of this literature focuses on the spatial dimensions of crime. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), for example, find a positive effect of city size on crime rates in the US, which they partly attribute to increased benefits from offending and reduced likelihood of arrest. Other studies consider whether a causal effect runs in the other direction, that is, from crime rates to city size (see, e.g. Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006). These empirical studies have been accompanied by theoretical research. Gaigné and Zenou (2015), for example, use a spatial general equilibrium model to analyse the effects of crime on location choices and subsequent implications for city size.

To study the effects of crime and agglomeration on urban amenity, we estimate the inter-city location choice model from Donovan et al. (2022) using data for 134 locations in New Zealand. This model uses iso-utility and iso-cost equations for workers and firms to infer the effects of attributes on the implicit value of urban amenity. Our study has commonalities with Cullen and Levitt (1999), which link rising crime rates to urban flight in the US. More recently, Garretsen and Marlet (2017) report a negative effect of crime on house prices using data from the Netherlands. Perhaps the closest study to ours, however, is Berger et al. (2008), which use a similar model to identify a negative affect of crime on the value of urban amenity for cities in Russia. Despite similarities to Berger et al. (2008), we go further in two main respects: First, we consider the effects of crime for workers and firms and, second, we consider implications of crime for agglomeration economies.

We report three main results. First, we find that crime has significant negative effects on the value of urban amenity, with elasticities of approximately $-0.06$ and $-0.09$ for
firms and workers, respectively. Second, we find that accounting for endogeneity in the relationship between crime and rents causes the estimated effects of crime to double in magnitude. Third, we find that controlling for crime leads to somewhat larger estimates of agglomeration economies. That is, not only does crime detract from urban amenity but it may also act as a congestion cost that undermines agglomeration economies.

This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the model and data, Section 3 presents the results, Section 4 discusses the findings, and Section 5 concludes.

2 Methodology

2.1 Economic Model

We adopt the inter-city location choice model developed in Donovan et al. (2022), which draws on Roback (1982), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004), and Maré and Poot (2019). Here, we discuss the choices of workers and firms and implications for urban amenity.

2.1.1 Workers

Assume full-time workers choose their home location, $i$, given their preferences, $U_i$, for housing, $H_i$, a composite consumption good, $Y_i$, and local urban amenity, $A_{iu}$:

$$U_i = A_{iu} H_i^\alpha Y_i^{1-\alpha}, \quad (1)$$

where $\alpha$ is the cost share of housing. Both wages, $w_i$, and the price of housing, $r_i$, are set locally, whereas the price of $Y_i$ is the numeraire. From Equation (1) and the budget constraint, $w_i = r_i H_i + Y_i$, we can derive the demand functions $H_i^* = \alpha \left( w_i / r_i \right)$ and $Y_i^* = (1 - \alpha) w_i$. By substituting these functions into Equation (1) and imposing a spatial equilibrium condition—such that workers in all locations achieve utility, $\bar{v}$—we find:

$$v_i = \kappa^{iu} A_i w_i / r_i^2 = \bar{v}, \quad (2)$$
where $v_i$ is indirect utility and $\kappa^u = \alpha^\alpha(1 - \alpha)^{1 - \alpha}$ is a constant. Taking logs of Equation (2) and re-arranging yields the following iso-utility condition:

$$\ln A^u_i = \alpha \ln r_i - \ln w_i + \ln \tau - \ln \kappa^u,$$

which defines the implicit value of urban amenity to workers, $\ln A^u_i$, in equilibrium as a function of parameters and prices, namely rents and wages. That is, Equation (3) defines worker’s willingness-to-pay for the urban amenity that is available in location $i$.

### 2.1.2 Firms

Assume that there is a representative firm in each location that uses a commonly-available constant returns to scale technology to produce $Q_i$ units of the composite consumption good using floorspace, $F_i$; labour, $L_i$; and mobile capital, $K_i$. The inputs $F_i$, $L_i$, and $K_i$ augment production per the parameters $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$, and $1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2$, respectively. Formally, we assume the representative firm makes use of the following production function:

$$Q_i = A^y_i F_i^{\gamma_1} L_i^{\gamma_2} K_i^{1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2},$$

where $A^y_i$ denotes the contribution of urban amenity to production, as distinct from consumption. We assume firms pay $k$, $r_i$, and $w_i$ for capital, floorspace, and labour, respectively, and maximise profits to yield the following equilibrium condition:

$$r_i^{\gamma_1} w_i^{\gamma_2} k^{1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2} = \kappa^y A^y_i,$$

where $\kappa^y = \gamma_1^{\gamma_2} \gamma_2^{\gamma_1} (1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2)^{1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2}$. Re-arranging Equation (5) then yields:

$$\ln A^y_i = \gamma_1 \ln r_i + \gamma_2 \ln w_i + (1 - \gamma_1 - \gamma_2) \ln k - \ln \kappa^y,$$

which is the iso-cost condition that defines the implicit value of urban amenity to firms.

### 2.1.3 Urban amenity

The marginal effect of a local attribute, $\ln x_i$, on the implicit value of urban amenity for workers and firms, $\ln A^u_i$ and $\ln A^y_i$, can then be found by differentiating Equations (3)
and (6) with respect to \( \ln x_i \) to yield:

\[
\frac{\partial \ln A^u_i}{\partial \ln x_i} = \alpha \frac{\partial \ln r_i}{\partial \ln x_i} - \frac{\partial \ln w_i}{\partial \ln x_i} = \alpha \epsilon^r_x - \epsilon^w_x = E_x^c, \tag{7}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \ln A^v_i}{\partial \ln x_i} = \gamma_1 \frac{\partial \ln r_i}{\partial \ln x_i} + \gamma_2 \frac{\partial \ln w_i}{\partial \ln x_i} = \gamma_1 \epsilon^r_x + \gamma_2 \epsilon^w_x = E_x^p. \tag{8}
\]

Here, the space-invariant terms \( \ln \kappa^u, \ln \tau, \ln k, \) and \( \ln \kappa^y \) drop out and we assume the effect of \( \ln x_i \) is constant between locations. We also let \( \frac{\partial \ln r_i}{\partial \ln x_i} = \epsilon^r_x \) and \( \frac{\partial \ln w_i}{\partial \ln x_i} = \epsilon^w_x \), that is, elasticities of rents and wages with respect to \( \ln x_i \). Equations (7) and (8) conveniently express the marginal effect of \( \ln x_i \) on the value of urban amenity for workers and firms, \( E^c_x \) and \( E^p_x \), as linear combinations of rent and wage elasticities with respect to \( \ln x_i \). The remainder of this study focuses on estimating rent and wage elasticities with respect to crime and agglomeration, which we combine per Equations (7) and (8).

### 2.2 Sources of Data

#### 2.2.1 Wages and rents

We use data on individual workers and dwellings from the 2018 New Zealand Census ("Census") for 134 urban areas defined by Statistics New Zealand.\(^1\) To control for compositional differences that cause wages and rents to vary between locations, Donovan et al. (2022) estimate a set of first-stage regressions, which yield spatial wage and rent premia, \( \ln w_i \) and \( \ln r_i \), for each location.\(^2\) From Donovan et al. (2022), we use estimates of \( \ln w_i \) and \( \ln r_i \) in 2018 as well as estimates of the cost share of housing in consumption, \( \alpha = 0.245 \), and the cost shares of floorspace and labour in production, \( \gamma_1 = 0.10 \) and \( \gamma_2 = 0.63 \). Figure 1 presents histograms of \( \ln w_i \) (left panel) and \( \ln r_i \) (centre panel) as well as a scatter plot (right panel) of \( \ln w_i \) (vertical axis) versus \( \ln r_i \) (horizontal axis). In Figure 2, we present scatter plots of \( \ln w_i \) (left panel) and \( \ln r_i \) (right panel) versus the urban population for each location \( P_i \) (horizontal axis). Both panels reveals the expected positive association, which provides informal evidence of the agglomeration economies that are documented in detail in Donovan et al. (2022).

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1. Readers are referred to Donovan et al. (2022) for further details on the wage, rent, and population data.
2. For wages, the first-stage regressions control for gender, age (polynomial by gender), qualifications (\( n = 10 \)), two-digit industry sector (\( n = 54 \)), ethnicity (\( n = 15 \)), religion (\( n = 11 \)), and birthplace (\( n = 12 \)). For rents, the first-stage regressions control for the number of bedrooms (\( n = 10 \)) and rooms (\( n = 10 \)) as well as dwelling type (\( n = 8 \)) and main source of heating (\( n = 8 \)).
Figure 1: Left and centre panels: Histograms of spatial wage and rent premia, $\ln w_i$ and $\ln r_i$, respectively, where the dashed vertical lines indicate the mean. Right panel: $\ln w_i$ (vertical axis) versus $\ln r_i$ (horizontal axis), where the size of the point denotes the population.

Figure 2: Left and right panels plots spatial wage and rent premia, $\ln w_i$ and $\ln r_i$ (vertical axes), respectively, versus population, $\ln P_i$ (horizontal axis).

2.2.2 Reported crime

We downloaded data on victimisations (“crimes”) that were reported to the New Zealand Police (“the Police”) by location, date, and type for the five-year period from July 2017 to June 2022 (New Zealand Police, 2022). The data includes 1,152,761 reported victimisations of which 92% occurred in the 134 urban areas in our data. For each urban area,
Figure 3: Left panel: Average annual victimisations per 1,000 residents, $V_i$ (vertical axis) versus cumulative population (horizontal axis), where urban areas are in descending order and the dashed horizontal line denotes the mean. Right panel: Total victimisations per month for all 134 urban areas.

Figure 4: Left and centre panels: Spatial wage and rent premia, $\ln w_i$ and $\ln r_i$ (vertical axes), respectively, versus the log of victimisations per 1,000 residents, $\ln V_i$, where size of the points denotes population. Right panel: $\ln V_i$ (vertical axis) versus population, $\ln P_i$ (horizontal axis).

we have information on three types of crime that vary in terms of their seriousness.\(^4\) The left panel of Figure 3 shows average victimisations per 1,000 residents per annum, $V_i$ (vertical axis), in descending order versus the cumulative population (horizontal axis). We observe more than a ten-fold difference in victimisation rates between urban areas. The right panel of Figure 3 presents total victimisations per month. Victimisations are relatively stable for the first 18 months of the period but then become more erratic due to COVID-19. For this reason, our regressions only use victimisation data for the first 12-month period from July 2017 to June 2018, which aligns closely with the timing of the Census that was undertaken on 6 March, 2018. The left and middle panels of Figure

\(^4\) “Less serious” crimes (86%) are theft and related offences; unlawful entry with intent; burglary; and breaking and entering. “More serious” crimes (13%) are abduction; harassment and related offences against people; acts intended to cause injury; robbery, extortion and related offences; and sexual assault and related offences. Crimes involving a weapon represent 1.4% of all victimisations in this dataset.
plot the log of victimisations per 1,000 residents, $\ln V_i$ (horizontal axes), versus wage and rent premia, $\ln w_i$ and $\ln r_i$, respectively. We observe no obvious association with the former but a negative association with the latter. The right panel of Figure 4 reveals a positive association between $\ln V_i$ (vertical axis) and population, $\ln P_i$ (horizontal axis).

The data in the right panel of Figure 4 implies an elasticity of victimisations per capita with respect to city size of 0.10, which we can compare to previous studies. Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), for example, report elasticities of serious crimes with respect to population of 0.16–0.24 for US cities in 1986, although a lower elasticity of 0.12 is found using victimisation data. Similarly, O’Flaherty and Sethi (2015) report statistically significant elasticities for robbery (0.33), motor vehicle theft (0.23), murder (0.16), and aggravated assault (0.08) with respect to metropolitan population in the U.S. in 2012. Finally, Gaigné and Zenou (2015) report an elasticity of crime rates with respect to urban population of 0.37 using data for 94 French departments. Although our victimisation data also suggests a positive elasticity between crime rates and city size, the magnitude of the relationship appears to be somewhat smaller than that found in these earlier studies.

2.2.3 Surveyed crime

The victimisation data discussed in Section 2.2.2 captures only offences that are reported to the Police. As a result, it will tend to underestimate overall levels of criminal offending. Perhaps more importantly for our analysis, the rate with which offences are reported to the Police might systematically vary with factors that also give rise to spatial variation in levels of crime. To account for variation in reporting rates between urban areas, we draw on data from four waves of the annual New Zealand Crime and Victims Survey (“NZCVS”) for the period 2018–2021. Each wave of the NZCVS involves approximately 8,000 randomly-selected people, who are asked questions about their experiences of crime. Although data from the NZCVS is not available for the same 134 urban areas that characterise our other data, it is available for 66 local government authorities (“TLAs”).

Figure 5 illustrates aspects of the NZCVS data. The left panel presents a histogram of reporting rates—that is, the share of reported offences to total offences—for each TLA, $r_j$, where we pool data across four waves of the NZCVS. We find a mean reporting rate

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5 We also estimated elasticities between crime and population density, although these were much smaller. This may reflect that our data includes many small locations that differ more in population than in density.
of approximately 27% across the sample, which implies that only around one in four
offences is reported to the Police. As such, we have prima facie evidence that under-
reporting is quantitatively important to understanding total levels of crime. The middle
and right panels then plot reporting rates (vertical axis) versus victimisations, $\ln V_j$, and
the population of the TLA, $\ln P_j$ (horizontal axes). We observe a slight positive association
between reporting rates and crime, but not with population.

### 2.3 Quantitative Methods

#### 2.3.1 Estimation

To identify the effects of crime, $\ln V_i$, and agglomeration, $\ln P_i$, on rents and wages, we
simultaneously estimate two linear models with the following general form:

\[
\ln r_i = \varepsilon_r^v \ln V_i + \varepsilon_r^a \ln P_i + \zeta_j^r,
\]

\[
\ln w_i = \varepsilon_w^v \ln V_i + \varepsilon_w^a \ln P_i + \zeta_j^w.
\]

Where $\ln r_i$ and $\ln w_i$ denote the spatial rent and wage premia; $\varepsilon_r^v$, $\varepsilon_w^v$, $\varepsilon_r^a$, and $\varepsilon_w^a$ denote
the elasticities of rents and wages with respect to crime and agglomeration, respectively;
and $\zeta_j^r$ and $\zeta_j^w$ denote TLA-specific intercepts that we discuss below. Here, we measure
$\ln P_i$ by the urban population, such that $\varepsilon_r^v$ and $\varepsilon_w^v$ can be interpreted as the elasticities of
$\ln r_i$ and $\ln w_i$ with respect to $\ln V_i$ when holding the population, $\ln P_i$, constant.
Our choice of quantitative methods responds to three empirical issues. First, as the spatial rent and wage premia, $\ln r_i$ and $\ln w_i$, are estimated from micro-data, they are random variables that are measured with uncertainty, or sampling error. Second, we must contend with endogeneity. Although several studies, such as Combes et al. (2010) and Donovan et al. (2022), find that endogeneity in the quantity of labour supply is not a major threat to the identification of agglomeration economies, the same is not necessarily true for crime (cf. Section 2.3.2). Third, we wish to account for under-reporting of crime, which affects both the levels of $\ln V_i$ and introduces uncertainty. The problem of measurement error—specifically, errors-in-outcomes (“EIO”) and errors-in-variables (“EIV”)—is not easily addressed using maximum likelihood methods. Instead, to account for uncertainty in $\ln r_i$, $\ln w_i$, and $\ln V_i$, we adopt Bayesian multi-level methods, which enable us to account for measurement error in a direct and theoretically consistent manner.

In distributional notation, we estimate variants of the following multi-level model:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ln r_i & \sim \mathcal{N}(\ln r_i^*, (s_{r_i^*})^2) \quad \text{(A.1)} \\
\ln w_i & \sim \mathcal{N}(\ln w_i^*, (s_{w_i^*})^2) \quad \text{(A.2)} \\
\ln V_i & \sim \mathcal{N}(\ln V_i^*, (s_{V_i^*})^2) \quad \text{(A.3)} \\
\ln r_i^* & \sim \mathcal{N}(\ln r_i^*, \ln V_i^* + \varepsilon_{r_i}^* \ln P_i + \zeta_j^r + f_{\alpha}^r(\epsilon_{v,i}) + f_{\alpha}^r(\epsilon_{a,i}), (\sigma^r)^2) \quad \text{(B.1)} \\
\ln w_i^* & \sim \mathcal{N}(\ln w_i^*, \ln V_i^* + \varepsilon_{w_i}^* \ln P_i + \zeta_j^w + f_{\alpha}^w(\epsilon_{v,i}) + f_{\alpha}^w(\epsilon_{a,i}), (\sigma^w)^2) \quad \text{(B.2)} \\
\zeta_j^r & \sim \mathcal{N}(0, (\sigma_j^r)^2), \quad \zeta_j^w \sim \mathcal{N}(0, (\sigma_j^w)^2). \quad \text{(B.3)}
\end{align*}
\]

This multi-level model comprises two types of levels. Type A denotes the three levels for the distributions of the latent variables, $\ln r_i^*$ (A.1), $\ln w_i^*$ (A.2), and $\ln V_i^*$ (A.3), which are defined by their means ($\ln r_i$, $\ln w_i$, and $\ln V_i$) and standard errors ($s_{r_i^*}$, $s_{w_i^*}$) and deviations ($s_{V_i^*}$) that are estimated from the first-stage regressions and under-reporting model (cf. Section 2.3.3), respectively. Type B denotes the three levels associated with the linear models of the spatial rent (B.1) and wage (B.2) premia, which contain the elasticities that are of primary interest, that is, $\varepsilon_{r_i}$, $\varepsilon_{w_i}$, $\varepsilon_{a}$, and $\varepsilon_{a}$.

In both linear models, we include individual effects per TLA, $\zeta_j^r$ and $\zeta_j^w$, to control for unobserved sources of heterogeneity at the local council level, which we model as group-level effects (B.3). To address endogeneity in $\ln V_i$ and $\ln P_i$, we include control functions, $f_{\alpha}^r(\epsilon_{v,i})$, $f_{\alpha}^w(\epsilon_{v,i})$, $f_{\alpha}^r(\epsilon_{a,i})$, and $f_{\alpha}^w(\epsilon_{a,i})$, which we return to in Section 2.3.2. This multi-level model structure allows us to address measurement error arising from EIO ($\ln r_i$, $\ln w_i$) and EIV ($\ln V_i$).

\[\text{6 Specifically, all models are estimated using the statistical package R running in the RStudio environment with the brms package (R Core Team, 2023; RStudio Team, 2023; Bürkner, 2017).}\]
2.3.2 Endogeneity

To identify the causal effect of crime on spatial rent and wage premia, \( \ln r_i \) and \( \ln w_i \), we consider it important to address the risk of endogeneity for at least two reasons. First, the cross-sectional nature of our analysis increases the risk of omitted variables and, second, there are obvious channels through which causal effects could also run from wages and rents to crime and population, \( \ln V_i \) and \( \ln P_i \). In order to address endogeneity, we estimate models that include control functions for \( \ln V_i \) and \( \ln P_i \) in both the rent (B.1) and wage (B.2) equations, which we denote by \( f_r^v(\epsilon_{v,i}) \), \( f_r^a(\epsilon_{a,i}) \), \( f_w^v(\epsilon_{v,i}) \), and \( f_w^a(\epsilon_{a,i}) \), respectively. This involves first regressing the endogenous variables \( \ln V_i \) and \( \ln P_i \) versus \( q \) exogenous instruments, \( \ln Z_q^i \), as well as the other explanatory variables. We then include the potentially endogenous residuals from the first-stage regressions, \( \epsilon_{v,i} \) and \( \epsilon_{a,i} \), in the linear models for \( \ln r_i \) and \( \ln w_i \) per the control functions \( f_r^v(\epsilon_{v,i}) \), \( f_r^a(\epsilon_{a,i}) \), \( f_w^v(\epsilon_{v,i}) \), and \( f_w^a(\epsilon_{a,i}) \). If parameters associated with these control functions are statistically significant, then we have evidence of endogeneity. Compared to instrumental variables, one advantage of using control functions is their underlying identifying assumptions still hold in non-linear models and for non-linear endogenous relationships.

We make use of two instruments. The first, \( \ln Z_1^i \), is a Bartik instrument that uses data on employment for 4-digit industry sectors (\( n = 64 \)). Specifically, \( \ln Z_1^i = \ln \left( \sum_k J_{kit-1} \frac{\hat{J}_{kt}}{J_{kt-1}} \right) \), where \( J_{kit-1} \) denotes employment in sector \( k \), location \( i \), at time \( t - 1 \) and \( \hat{J}_{kt} \) denotes employment in sector \( k \) at time \( t \) in locations other than \( i \). That is, \( Z_1^i \) is the inner-product of lagged local sectoral employment and nationwide sectoral growth rates. Borusyak et al. (2022) demonstrate that \( Z_1^i \) is valid when exogenous labour demand shocks are as-good-as-randomly assigned conditional on their unobservable elements. In our setting, local sectoral employment \( J_{kit-1} \) is lagged by five years to the previous census in 2013. Moreover, the spatial wage premia control for a variety of characteristics of workers, such as two-digit industry sectors, age, gender, ethnicity, and qualifications. On this basis, we argue national employment growth rates act as randomly-assigned labour demand-shifting across industry sectors, such that \( \ln Z_1^i \) is valid. We expect \( \ln Z_1^i \) is negatively and positively associated with crime and population, respectively.

The second instrument, \( \ln Z_2^i \), uses an allocation of additional Police that was announced on 20 August 2018 (New Zealand Police, 2018). This announcement—which occurred after the 2018 Census and the period covered by the victimisation data—allocated 1,800 additional Police across 12 districts in New Zealand. For each district \( k \), we
multiply the allocation of additional Police to the district, \( A_k \), with the share of the population in \( k \) that is within location \( i \), \( p_{ki} \), and then sum over the districts within \( i \). That is, \( \ln Z_i^2 = \ln (\sum_{k \in i} p_{ki} A_k) \). For \( \ln Z_i^2 \) to be valid, \( A_k \) must be independent of the spatial rent and wage premia, \( \ln r_i \) and \( \ln w_i \), conditional on controlling for crime, \( \ln V_i \); agglomeration, \( \ln P_i \); and TLA effects, \( \zeta_r^j \) and \( \zeta_w^j \). In New Zealand, the Police are funded and managed via central government, which is elected using a proportional nation-wide electoral system. This implies the allocation of Police is more likely to be independent of local conditions that also affect \( \ln r_i \) and \( \ln w_i \). And, as noted above, \( \ln r_i \) and \( \ln w_i \) control for some observed characteristics of workers and dwellings. The conditional independence of \( \ln Z_i^2 \) is further strengthened by the inclusion of the TLA effects, \( \zeta_r^j \) and \( \zeta_w^j \), which control for unobserved attributes at a level that is generally more detailed than the 12 districts to which the additional Police were allocated. For these reasons, we argue \( \ln Z_i^2 \) is valid. We expect \( \ln Z_i^2 \) is positively associated with crime but not population.

### 2.3.3 Under-reporting

The final aspect of our quantitative methods concerns under-reporting. Let \( V_j^r \) denote the number of crimes that are reported to the Police (“successes”) and \( V_j^e \) denote the total number of crimes that are experienced (“trials”) in TLA \( j \) at time \( t \) per the NZCVS data. We can then estimate a simple Binomial model with logit link as follows:

\[
V_j^r \sim B(V_j^e, \alpha_j + \alpha_t) \\
\alpha_j \sim N(0, \sigma_j^2), \quad \alpha_t \sim N(0, \sigma_t^2)
\]

(Reporting model)

where \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_t \) denote TLA and year group-level effects, which we assume follow Normal distributions with variances, \( \sigma_j^2 \) and \( \sigma_t^2 \), respectively. Together, \( \alpha_j \) and \( \alpha_t \) control for spatial and temporal variation in reporting rates. We estimate variants of this model using NZCVS data, for which results are available on request. We find no evidence of temporal variation via \( \alpha_t \) but we do find evidence of spatial variation via \( \alpha_j \). Using this model, we can estimate reporting rates per TLA, \( r_j \), and adjust reported victimisations, \( R_i \), to account for under-reporting, such that \( \ln V_i = \ln (R_i / r_j) \). As \( r_j \) is a random variable that is measured with uncertainty, this results in a distribution for \( \ln V_i \) with standard deviation, \( s_i^V \). In Figure 6, the left panel plots \( \ln V_i \) versus \( \ln R_i \) and reveals somewhat subtle differences. The right panel then plots \( s_i^V \) versus population, \( \ln P_i \). As larger populations are sampled more often in the NZCVS, they tend to have smaller \( s_i^V \).
Table 1 summarises our main results. The first panel presents the estimates of the elasticities of the rent and wage premia, $\ln r_i$ and $\ln w_i$, with respect to crime, $\ln V_i$ (rows 1 and 2), and agglomeration, $\ln P_i$ (rows 3 and 4), respectively. The second panel then presents the estimates of the elasticities of the value of urban amenity with respect to $\ln V_i$ (rows 5 and 6) and $\ln P_i$ (rows 7 and 8). We compute these amenity elasticities—that is, $E^r_v$, $E^w_v$, $E^r_a$, and $E^w_a$—directly from the posterior distributions of the wage and rent elasticities—that is, $\varepsilon^r_v$, $\varepsilon^w_v$, $\varepsilon^r_a$, and $\varepsilon^w_a$—per Equations (7) and (8). In Model 1, we estimate simple linear models of $\ln r_i$ and $\ln w_i$ versus $\ln P_i$. In Model 2, we include $\ln V_i$ in terms of reported victimisations. In Model 3, we account for sampling error in $\ln r_i$ and $\ln w_i$ (EIO). Model 4 includes linear control functions, $f^r_v(\varepsilon_{r,i})$, $f^r_a(\varepsilon_{a,i})$, $f^w_v(\varepsilon_{v,i})$, and $f^w_a(\varepsilon_{a,i})$, to address the potential risk of endogeneity in $\ln V_i$ and $\ln P_i$. As Model 4 does not reveal evidence of endogeneity in $\ln w_i$, Model 5 includes only linear control functions in the rent equation. Model 6 specifies $f^r_v(\varepsilon_{v,i})$ and $f^r_a(\varepsilon_{a,i})$ as generalised additive models (“GAM”), which allows for non-parametric, non-linear effects on $\ln r_i$ (for details, see Wood, 2017). In Model 7, we replace our measure of crime with one that accounts for under-reporting. Finally, in Model 8—which is our preferred model—we allow for measurement error (EIV) in our estimate of total crime, $\ln V_i$. 

3 Results
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<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.027</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
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<td>(0.015)</td>
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|     | E^ζ_0| -0.026| -0.026| -0.057| -0.050| -0.051| -0.054| -0.056 |
|     | (0.006)| (0.016)| (0.023)| (0.015)| (0.016)| (0.016)| (0.017) |
|     | E^ζ_ν| -0.026| -0.025| -0.071| -0.082| -0.080| -0.086| -0.092 |
|     | (0.011)| (0.025)| (0.037)| (0.026)| (0.026)| (0.027)| (0.029) |
|     | E^w_0| 0.024| 0.029| 0.028| 0.036| 0.035| 0.036| 0.036|
|     | (0.004)| (0.004)| (0.010)| (0.011)| (0.010)| (0.010)| (0.010) |
|     | E^w_ν| -0.006| -0.002| -0.001| 0.011| 0.013| 0.014| 0.014|
|     | (0.007)| (0.007)| (0.017)| (0.017)| (0.016)| (0.016)| (0.016) |

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**Table 1**: Regression results. The first panel presents the estimates of the elasticities of the spatial rent and wage premia, ln r_i and ln w_i, with respect to crime, ln V_i (rows 1 and 2), and agglomeration, ln P_i (rows 3 and 4). The second panel presents the estimates of the elasticities of the value of urban amenity with respect to ln V_i (rows 5 and 6) and ln P_i (rows 7 and 8). In Model 1, we regress ln r_i and ln w_i versus ln P_i. In Model 2, we include ln V_i in terms of reported victimisations. In Model 3, we account for sampling error in ln V_i (EIO). In Model 4 add linear control functions, f_i(ε_0,i), f_i(ε_0,i), f_i(ε_0,i), and f_i(ε_0,i), to address the risk of endogeneity. As Model 4 does not reveal evidence of endogeneity between ln w_i, ln V_i, and ln P_i, Model 5 includes linear control functions only in the rent equation. Model 6 specifies f_i(ε_0,i) and f_i(ε_0,i) as generalised additive models (“GAM”), which allows ε_0,i and ε_0,i to have non-linear, non-parametric effects on ln r_i (for details, see Wood, 2017). In Model 7, we replace the measure of crime, ln V_i, with one that accounts for under-reporting. Finally, in Model 8 we allow for measurement error (EIV) in the measure of crime, ln V_i. The loo-ic measures the out-of-sample performance of each model using efficient leave-one-out cross-validation, where lower values are preferred (for details, see Vehtari et al., 2017). For Models 4–8, the loo-ic values are not significantly different. In all models, we include TLA group-level effects in both the rent and wage equations, ζ^r_i and ζ^w_i, and n = 134.
In terms of performance, we find no statistically significant differences in the loo-ic values between Models 4–8. That said, in Model 4 the parameters associated with the control functions in the wage equations are not significant, unlike those for the rent equations. We prefer Model 8, which has the lowest loo-ic and accounts for under-reporting of crimes and the associated measurement error, or EIV. Model 8 implies the elasticity of the value of urban amenity with respect to agglomeration is 0.036 (s.e. 0.010) for firms ($E^p_a$) and 0.013 (s.e. 0.016) for workers ($E^w_a$), which aligns closely with the estimates in Donovan et al. (2022). Whereas the elasticity of the value of urban amenity with respect to crime is $-0.056$ (s.e. 0.017) for firms ($E^p_v$) and $-0.092$ (s.e. 0.029) for workers ($E^w_v$). These results suggest that crime has significant negative effects on the value of urban amenity, especially for workers. For crime, both the elasticities of rents and wages are negative, although the latter is not significant at the 95% level. This suggests the economic effects of crime operate primarily via adjustments in rents more so than wages.

Comparing Models 3 and 4, accounting for endogeneity causes the rent elasticities, $\varepsilon^r_v$ and $\varepsilon^r_a$, to increase significantly in magnitude. Figure 7 plots the residuals from the rent (left panels) and wage (right panels) equations in Model 3 versus the two instruments, $\ln Z^1_i$ (top panels) and $\ln Z^2_i$ (bottom panels). We observe no systematic relationship between residuals and instruments, providing informal reassurance of their validity.

To finish, we undertake a series of sensitivity tests to check the robustness of these findings, for which the results are not reported but are available on request. In the first test, we make two changes to Model 8: First, we allow for heteroskedastic variance—that is, we include TLA specific group effects, such that $\sigma^r = \sigma^r_j$ and $\sigma^w = \sigma^w_j$—and, second, we allow the rent and wage equations to follow Student’s-t distributions. As the more sophisticated model returns almost identical parameter estimates to Model 8, we conclude that heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity do not pose major threats to our results. Second, and in a similar spirit, we re-estimate the eight models reported in Table 1 but exclude the three largest cities in our data, namely Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, to ensure the latter do not exert excessive influence over the results. Again, our parameter estimates are essentially unchanged. Third, we extend Model 8 such that it also estimates the elasticity of crime with respect to population. This involves introducing a new level to the model, which consists of a linear model for the latent variable for crime, $\ln V_i^*$, specifically, $\ln V_i^* \sim \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon^v_a \ln P_i + \zeta^v_j + r^v_a(\epsilon_{a,i})), (\sigma^v)^2)$. Here, we include TLA-specific effects, $\zeta^v_j$, and a control function to address endogeneity, $r^v_a(\epsilon_{a,i})$. This model estimates the elasticity of crime with respect to population, $\varepsilon^v_a = 0.22$, which is approximately twice as large as the simple elasticity reported in Section 2.2.2 and closer to the values reported in other studies, such as Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999).
4 Discussion

We note three main findings. First, we find that crime, ln $V_i$, has significant negative effects on the value of urban amenity, with elasticities of approximately $-0.06$ for firms and $-0.09$ for workers. To put these effects in context, we re-estimate Model 8 including the average temperature per location, ln $T_i$, which has received considerable attention in the urban economics literature (see, e.g., Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). In this model,
we also divide $\ln V_i$ and $\ln T_i$ by their standard deviations, such that the associated parameters denote the effect of a one standard deviation increase. We find $\ln T_i$ has no effect on the wage premia but it does have a statistically significant positive effect on the rent premia. The effects of crime, $\ln V_i$, on the value of urban amenity is 2–3 times larger than that for $\ln T_i$. That is, crime has relatively large effects on the value of amenity and, by extension, location choice. Such effects would seem to be relevant to policy.

Second, we find that endogeneity poses a major threat to our efforts to identify the causal effect of crime on rents, with estimates of the elasticity of rents with respect to crime, $\varepsilon_{r,v}$, approximately twice as large in models that account for endogeneity. The effects of the latter are indeed more important than measurement error—both EIO and EIV—and under-reporting. The last result may reflect that less severe crimes are less likely to be reported (Lantz et al., 2022). Indeed, when we re-estimate our reporting model and include the percentage of crimes that involve a weapon as an explanatory variable, the associated parameter is positive and significant at the 90% level. If the crimes that go unreported are, on average, less severe, then this may explain why accounting for under-reporting does not have a significant effect on our results.

Third, we find that controlling for crime causes estimates of agglomeration economies to increase by approximately 0.01–0.02 points, respectively. This average effect is similar to that reported in Donovan et al. (2022) (cf. Table 2) when controlling for commuting costs. Although the average effect of controlling for crime on agglomeration economies is statistically insignificant, other evidence also suggests a link between the two processes. In Figure 8, the left panel shows variation in estimates of location-specific agglomeration economies in consumption, $E_{n,i}^c$, from Donovan et al. (2022). The right panel plots $E_{n,i}^c$ versus crime, $\ln V_i$, revealing a negative association. Using a regression that accounts for measurement error, controls for endogeneity, and includes TLA effects, we estimate the elasticity of $E_{n,i}^c$ with respect to $\ln V_i$ to be $-0.13$ (s.e. 0.02). Thus, we have evidence that crime is a significant “congestion cost” that erodes agglomeration economies.

To finish, we note three limitations of our study. First, as we have only 134 observations, our analyses have only modest statistical power. It would be useful to revisit these analyses using additional Census waves, when available. Second, cross-sectional analyses are vulnerable to unobserved heterogeneity. Additional census waves would enable the inclusion of location-specific effects, $\zeta_i^r$ and $\zeta_i^w$, and strengthen identification. Third, our measures of crime may act as proxies for other outcomes that reduce the value of urban amenity. Disentangling the effects of these outcomes might be useful for policy.
5 Conclusions

We use a model of inter-city location choice and data for 134 urban areas in New Zealand to study the effects of crime and agglomeration on the value of urban amenity. In doing so, we arrive at three main findings. First, we find that crime has significant negative effects on the value of urban amenity, with elasticities of approximately $-0.06$ and $-0.09$ for firms and workers, respectively. Indeed, the value of urban amenity appears to be 2–3 times more sensitive to levels of crime than average temperature. Second, we find that endogeneity poses a major threat to our efforts to identify the causal effect of crime. Specifically, addressing endogeneity leads to effects that are almost twice as large. Third, we find that controlling for crime leads to somewhat larger estimates of agglomeration economies. And, by drawing on the location-specific estimates of agglomeration economies that are reported in Donovan et al., 2022, we show that crime appears to act as an urban congestion cost, that is, crime serves to erode agglomeration economies. Taken together, these findings suggest that—even within a relatively small country like New Zealand—spatial variation in the level of crime between locations is likely to be relevant to policy. Further research to strengthen our understanding of the effects of crime on urban economic outcomes—for example, that make use of panel data and hone in on specific microeconomic channels—would seem to be warranted.
References


