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Why is Price Discovery in Credit Default Swap Markets News–Specific?

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1. Introduction

A key interest of the finance profession is in understanding how new information is incorporated into securities prices. One approach is the study of *price discovery* across markets. If new information is simultaneously priced into different markets, this is evidence of informational efficiency. Evidence of one market pricing information faster than another by contrast suggests market inefficiencies. Studies on price discovery abound and often find some sort of inefficiencies in that one market leads in price discovery.⁴

In this paper we explore the idea that price discovery may in fact be news-specific. Traders in different markets may not be universally informed or uninformed. Rather, traders choosing to operate in one market may have an advantage (or disadvantage) with respect to one type of information but not necessarily with respect to other innovations.⁶ This could cause price discovery not to be unconditionally in favour of one market but to depend upon the type of innovation. It would also suggest a more nuanced view on the informational efficiency of markets – in that it may only hold conditional on specific information.

We focus our analysis on price discovery in equity and CDS markets. The evidence on whether equity returns lead CDS price changes is mixed. Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) suggest that both markets move simultaneously (but that both lead the corporate bond market) while Norden and Weber (2009) find that equity returns lead CDS price changes much more frequently than the other way around.⁷ Acharya and Johnson (2007) demonstrate

⁴ For example, Chan (1992) shows that equity index futures tend to lead the cash index, Hou (2007) and Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2011), along with many others, examine lead-lag effects between large and small cap equities, while Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) consider lead-lags between corporate bonds and equities.

⁶ In Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998) traders choose the market where they wish to make a trade conditional on each piece of information they receive. Here we take the view that certain investor groups may have a general preference for one market over another.

⁷ There is solid evidence that with very few exceptions CDS markets price information faster than corporate bond markets, although arbitrage relationships tie credit spreads and CDS prices together in the long run (Blanco, Brennan and Marsh, 2005). There is also evidence that the corporate bond market lags the stock market (Kwan, 1996; Downing, Underwood and Xing, 2009).

that under certain market conditions (typically bad news about the credit quality of specific firms) changes in CDS prices lead equity returns, a phenomenon they ascribe to insider trading by banks with access to non-public information about their customers.

We first analyze unconditional price discovery. We use daily panel data on U.S. firms larger in both cross-section and time series dimensions than typically examined previously to study the lead-lag relationships between equity returns and CDS price changes. We find that equity returns lead CDS price changes. This holds for individual firms and portfolios, for all size classifications and for all ratings categories. There is very little evidence that CDS price changes lead equity returns. This is strong evidence in favour of an informational advantage of equity markets – in particular since we have constructed our sample to include only the most liquid CDS entities and thus have effectively biased the sample against finding an equity lead.

The key focus of our paper is to investigate more precisely the nature of the information that is priced faster in equity rather than CDS markets. Does the equity-lead arise for all type of information or only in response to some information? We first ask whether common and firm-specific information are both priced at different speeds. The evidence, based on alternative factor decompositions, is clear – the CDS market is slow at pricing common information, while it prices firm-specific news at about the same speed as the equity market. The dominant component of systematic information in equity returns that is priced slowly by the CDS market is, rather surprisingly, the (equity) market factor. One might have expected the (single) market factor to be more efficiently priced than news specific to individual firms. Second, we look at whether the lead-lag depends on whether there is positive or negative news in the equity market. We find that positive and negative equity market returns appear to

be priced at different speeds by the CDS market. Most of the lagged response of CDS prices is driven by slow CDS price changes in response to positive equity market returns.¹⁰

What can account for the news-specific nature of price discovery? We bring forward an explanation based on different investor groups being important in the two markets. While a wide range of investors with very diverse trading interests are active in equity markets, participation in the CDS market is much more limited. A key reason for the development of CDS markets was institutional investors' demand (predominantly by banks) for an instrument capable of hedging credit risks. The prevalence of hedgers in CDS markets can explain both the aggregate-idiosyncratic news and the positive-negative news asymmetries. As these investors are probably well informed about news specific to the firms in their portfolio, CDS markets respond efficiently to such news. However, hedgers of firm risks are likely to focus less on macro-news. In response to positive equity market news dealers in the CDS market can thus keep prices high and exploit their informational advantage. This dampens price adjustment in the CDS market and causes an equity-lead specific to positive macro news. In the event of bad equity market news, conversely, CDS prices rise immediately since in this case rapid adjustment is in the interest of dealers.¹¹

If this explanation is correct, we would expect the lead-lag and its asymmetries to depend on proxies for the hedging demand for a firm's debt. We consider four proxies for hedging demand on the firm level: the amount of outstanding debt, default risk, the variability default risk and financial industry membership. We find that three of the four proxies for hedging demand are positively and significantly related to observed lead-lag asymmetries, supporting

¹⁰ Our findings are therefore complementary to Acharya and Johnson (2007). Acharya and Johnson argue that CDS markets can lead equities when there is bad news about a specific company, while our results suggest that CDS markets lag equities in pricing good news about the general economy.

¹¹ Asymmetric responses to positive and negative price shocks are widespread in goods markets (Bacon, 1991) where the phenomenon is driven by consumers facing search costs which afford intermediaries a degree of market power. Recently, Green, Li and Schürhoff (2010) – interpreting search costs as informational asymmetries – show that such asymmetries can also occur in financial markets (municipal bond markets).

the idea that the lead-lag relationship is driven by the hedging focus of investors in the CDS market. We consider this to be a key contribution of our paper: to our best knowledge this is the first evidence linking the informational efficiency of markets to differences in trading motives across markets.

A second implication of our explanation is that in periods of high informational asymmetry the CDS market's lag should be longer – because dealers then have greater pricing power vis-à-vis uninformed investors. We capture variations in levels of information asymmetry through the behaviour of equity market bid-ask spreads and by examining major macroeconomic news announcements. We show that when information asymmetry is high – identified by either larger than usual bid-ask spreads or in days immediately preceding major macroeconomic news announcements – CDS returns are particularly sensitive to lagged positive equity returns.

Summarizing, this paper contributes to our understanding of the informational efficiency of markets by showing that price discovery can be predominantly news-specific: for equity and CDS markets there is a stark and robust asymmetry in the pricing of new information. We attribute this asymmetry to the fact that traders in one market may only be informed with respect to some type of innovation. Evidence using proxies for hedging demands in CDS markets supports the idea of the asymmetries being connected to investor clienteles with different information sets operating in both markets.¹³

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes.

¹³ It is an interesting question whether price discovery in other markets is similarly news-specific and whether this can be linked to investor clienteles as well.

2. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics

The CDS data used in our analysis were provided by a credit-oriented hedge fund that wishes to remain anonymous. The data supplier selected over 900 U.S. reference entities with publicly traded equity prices and provided daily five year maturity single-name CDS prices for the period 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008. The prices are an average of end business day mid-price quotes from a panel of major market participants with outlier and stale quotes removed. Returns are calculated as changes in the log of price levels.

Many of the reference entities' CDS are very illiquid. These are flagged as such in the database (this indicator refers to liquidity at the point in time when the database was created). To concentrate our analysis on the most liquid firms, we retain only those reference entities flagged as liquid in the database and with non-zero daily CDS returns for at least 90% of the sample period analysed. We also only retain entities with CDS (and equity) prices available for the full sample period.

Each reference entity was matched to a traded equity identifier (Bloomberg ticker) which we then manually translated into a CRSP identifier (permno). Matched daily closing equity mid-market prices were extracted from CRSP. We use daily log returns based on these CDS and equity prices as the key variables in our analysis. The final data set comprises 193 reference entities, each with 1,208 daily return observations for both equities and CDS. The firms retained are detailed in an Appendix.

Table 1 reports some basic descriptive statistics. Univariate statistics suggest equity and CDS daily returns are broadly comparable, although the interquartile range of CDS returns is broader than for equities and the standard deviation of CDS returns is higher. CDS prices on average increased in the sample and the distribution of returns is positively skewed. Equity prices fell, on average, and the distribution of equity returns is negatively skewed. Both

distributions exhibit high levels of kurtosis. More important patterns emerge from the correlation statistics. Equity returns exhibit very low autocorrelations, while those for the CDS market are much larger in magnitude, especially at the first lag. Cross-autocorrelations also differ markedly. Lagged CDS returns are only weakly (negatively) correlated with equity returns but the first lag of equity returns is strongly negatively correlated with CDS returns. The magnitude of this correlation is similar to the magnitude of the contemporaneous correlation. The magnitude of the correlation with the second lag of equity returns is markedly smaller. Together, the significantly positive autocorrelation and significantly negative correlation with lagged equity returns are indicative of the inefficiencies in the CDS market that this paper investigates.

3. Analysis

3.1 Equity-CDS Lead-Lag Relationships

Several papers have noted that, in general, equity returns lead CDS returns. There are occasions when the reverse appears to be true but these are not long-lasting periods of time, nor are they necessarily common for all entities. The first goal of this paper is to establish the robustness of the lead-lag relationship between equities and CDS for our panel. We emphasise that our data selection procedure outlined above was designed to produce a sample of reference entities with the most liquid CDS markets. As such, any evidence of a lag in the price discovery process for these firms would be suggestive of even more pronounced lags for less liquid entities.

We model the returns of equities and CDS in a standard bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) system of lag order k .

$$r_{i,t}^e = \alpha_0 + \sum_{j=1}^k \alpha_{1j} r_{i,t-j}^e + \sum_{j=1}^k \alpha_{2j} r_{i,t-j}^c + \varepsilon_{i,t}^e \quad (1a)$$

$$r_{i,t}^c = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_{1j} r_{i,t-j}^e + \sum_{j=1}^k \beta_{2j} r_{i,t-j}^c + \varepsilon_{i,t}^c \quad (1b)$$

where the dependent variables are the returns (r) on the equity (e) or CDS (c) of firm i at time t . Up to k lags of these variables are included as explanatory variables. Lag lengths are chosen according to the Akaike information criterion (but our results are not sensitive to changes in lag lengths). Not surprisingly, given the autocorrelation patterns described in Table 1, in the vast majority of cases the criterion selects just one lag. CDS returns would be deemed to lag equity returns for firm i if the θ coefficients are jointly non-zero, and equities would lag CDSs if the γ coefficients are jointly non-zero.¹⁴

Panel A of Table 2 summarises the results of estimating VARs for each reference entity individually and for all entities pooled together. The dominant finding is that lagged equity returns contain information for current CDS price changes, while the reverse is rarely the case. Specifically, we find that of the 193 reference entities studied, lagged equity returns were significant in explaining current CDS returns in 149 cases at the five percent level. Lagged CDS returns explained equity returns for only 12 entities. The results of estimating the pooled VAR are consistent – equity returns lead CDS returns, on average, over this sample period.

The VAR as specified in equations (1a) and (1b) does not control for contemporary CDS or equity returns, respectively. The delayed diffusion of information from equity to CDS markets suggested by our results may simply be due to the omission of contemporaneous

¹⁴ Acharya and Johnson (2007) use a different specification in their VAR which includes interactions of the stock returns (both contemporaneous and lagged) with the inverse CDS level to capture the likely non-linear relation between CDS and equity returns. However, this interaction term is not significant for 155 of the 193 firms in our data set and so we do not include it in our specifications. Our main findings are not sensitive to this decision.

equity returns from equation (1b). We test for this by incorporating the relevant contemporaneous return in each equation both for each reference entity individually and for all entities pooled together. Results are reported in the lower part of panel A. Our key finding - that CDS returns lag equity returns - is robust to the inclusion of contemporaneous equity returns.

Panel B of Table 2 summarises results when we pool the companies but split the sample according to the credit rating and equity market capitalisation of the firms. Irrespective of whether companies are rated AAA-A versus BBB-B, or whether they are in the smallest quartile or the middle 50% by market capitalization, lagged equity returns are significant in explaining current CDS returns. Lagged equity returns are not significant in pooled regressions for firms in the largest quartile but this is driven by a small number of firms since lagged equity returns are significant for the largest quintile (coefficient = -0.29, p-val = 0.000). Conversely, but irrespective of how we separate the firms, lagged CDS returns are not significant in the equity returns regressions, with the sole exception of the small firms. Even in this case, however, the magnitude of the coefficient is very small and the goodness of fit very low indicating statistical but not economic significance.

Finally, Panel C of Table 2 pools the companies but splits the sample into pre-crisis and crisis periods. The pre-crisis period runs from the start of the sample through the end of June 2007 while the crisis period runs from the start of August 2007 to the end of the sample period. Observations for July 2007 are dropped from the analysis. Again, there is a strong lag of the CDS market in both periods. It is interesting to note that the CDS predictability is higher in the crisis period (the coefficient on lagged equity returns is -0.349, compared to -0.226 before the crisis). There is some evidence of information in lagged CDS returns for the equity market prior to the crisis, but this is again statistically but not economically significant and, further, completely disappears during the crisis interval.

The results in Table 2 are based on regressions at the firm level. In Table 3 we show that the same findings hold when we form equally weighted portfolios. We form portfolios using all firms and based on industry classifications, ratings, and equity market capitalisation. We also divide the sample into pre-crisis and crisis periods. It can be seen that the basic findings are very robust across the various groupings.¹⁵

3.2 *Asymmetric response to common and firm-specific information*

In this sub-section we explore further the nature of the information that is being incorporated faster into equity prices than CDS prices. The consistency of the firm and portfolio level lead-lag results detailed in section 3.1 suggests that it is not just idiosyncratic information that is priced slowly in CDS markets and that there appears to be a systematic component. We therefore use several techniques to split equity and CDS returns into common factor and idiosyncratic components to determine the contribution of each to the delay in CDS pricing.

We begin with a statistical decomposition of returns based on principal components (PC) analysis. Using the full sample of data we extract p principal components for equity returns and q components for CDS returns. We then regress equity returns on the p equity principal components and collect, for each entity, a fitted series and a residual series. We view the fitted series as capturing the systematic or common component of each firm's equity returns while the residual series is assumed to capture the firm-specific component. We do the same for each firm's CDS returns using the q CDS principal components.

¹⁵ Hilscher, Pollet and Wilson (2011) report similar findings using a sample with different period and firm coverage, confirming the robustness of our results.

We then perform a VAR analysis using these decomposed returns (we also perform the regressions using common and idiosyncratic components of CDS returns as dependent variables for completeness):

$$r_{i,t}^{ecom} = \alpha_{10} + \alpha_{11}r_{i,t-1}^{ecom} + \alpha_{12}r_{i,t-1}^{eidio} + \alpha_{13}r_{i,t-1}^{ccom} + \alpha_{14}r_{i,t-1}^{cidio} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{ecom} \quad (2a)$$

$$r_{i,t}^{eidio} = \alpha_{20} + \alpha_{21}r_{i,t-1}^{ecom} + \alpha_{22}r_{i,t-1}^{eidio} + \alpha_{23}r_{i,t-1}^{ccom} + \alpha_{24}r_{i,t-1}^{cidio} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{eidio} \quad (2b)$$

$$r_{i,t}^{ccom} = \beta_{10} + \beta_{11}r_{i,t-1}^{ecom} + \beta_{12}r_{i,t-1}^{eidio} + \beta_{13}r_{i,t-1}^{ccom} + \beta_{14}r_{i,t-1}^{cidio} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{ccom} \quad (2c)$$

$$r_{i,t}^{cidio} = \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}r_{i,t-1}^{ecom} + \beta_{22}r_{i,t-1}^{eidio} + \beta_{23}r_{i,t-1}^{ccom} + \beta_{24}r_{i,t-1}^{cidio} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{cidio} \quad (2d)$$

Significant values for β_{11} (β_{12}) would suggest that the common (idiosyncratic) component of firm i 's lagged equity returns is important in explaining the common component of i 's CDS returns. Similarly, significant values for β_{21} (β_{22}) would imply that the common (idiosyncratic) component of lagged equity returns is important in explaining the firm-specific CDS return for the firm.

The choice of how many principal components to retain is rather arbitrary and we do not take a firm stand on the issue. If too few components are retained then components of the returns which are actually common are incorrectly labelled as idiosyncratic. Retain too many components and idiosyncratic elements of returns are incorrectly thought to be common. Thankfully, the tenor of our results is not sensitive to the exact number of components retained as long as the number of common components is at least one for both equities and CDS returns.

We report results based on three retained components for both equity and CDS returns in Panel A of Table 4. The results are quite stark. For 173 of the 193 companies, the lagged common component of equity returns significantly predicts the current common component

of CDS returns. By contrast, the lagged common CDS component is never significant in predicting the common equity component.

Second, there is some relatively weak evidence that lagged idiosyncratic equity returns predict idiosyncratic CDS returns (significant at 5% level for 28 companies, or 14.5% of the sample). The CDS market leads in the pricing of idiosyncratic information for 11.4 percent of the sample (22 companies).

Third, and as we would expect, there is little evidence that idiosyncratic equity returns predict common CDS returns, or that common equity returns predict idiosyncratic CDS returns.

The lead-lag relations between equity and CDS returns seen in the literature and confirmed in section 3.1 are hence almost entirely driven by the equity market's ability to incorporate common information faster than the CDS market.¹⁶ To a much lesser extent, the equity market also appears able to incorporate firm-specific information faster, although there are also cases where the CDS market leads in pricing idiosyncratic information. This final point probably reflects the insider trading issues raised in the conditional analysis of Acharya and Johnson (2007).

To confirm the results using equity factors motivated by the literature, rather than statistically derived principal components, we repeat the analysis using the three Fama-French factors.¹⁷ Since there is no recognised factor model for CDS returns we revert to using total CDS returns in the regressions. Results are reported in Panel B of Table 4. Lagged fitted equity returns based on the three Fama-French factors are significant for CDS returns for 178 companies (92% of the sample) while the lagged residual equity returns not explained by these factors are significant for 40 firms (21% of the sample). We find almost exactly the

¹⁶ Again, this conclusion is robust to including contemporaneous equity (CDS) returns in the CDS (equity) equation.

¹⁷ The returns on the Fama-French factors were sourced from Ken French's website.

same results if we use three principal components instead of Fama-French factors – lagged fitted returns are significant for 179 firms, and lagged residual returns are significant for 18 firms. Correlation analysis between the largest principal components for equity returns and Fama-French factors suggests that the first principal component is a very close proxy for the market. However, none of the other principal components correlate strongly with the Fama-French factors.

The similarity of the lead-lag results from PC and Fama-French-based analyses combined with the fact that these two approaches only appear to share one common factor suggest that the equity market return is behind most of the results. We proxy the equity market return in three ways – the first principal component, the return on an equally weighted portfolio of the equities in our sample, and the market return from the Fama-French database. Panel C of Table 4 reports the results of using lagged fitted values and lagged residuals from all three measures to explain CDS returns (with lagged CDS returns also included in the regressions). The results are quite consistent. Lagged equity market returns significantly explain CDS returns for a very large proportion of firms. Lagged idiosyncratic equity returns are much less frequently significant. It appears that the lead-lag relationship between equities and CDSs is mainly driven by a single common equity component – the market return.¹⁸

3.3 *Asymmetric response to positive and negative news*

¹⁸ Although the focus of this paper is on the cross asset-class information spillover, the autoregressive coefficient for CDS returns is very large, suggesting that while there is some information in lagged equity returns there appears to also be even more information in lagged CDS returns. Table 4, panel A confirms the inability of the CDS market to incorporate common information quickly. For all 193 companies, the lagged common component of CDS returns is significant in explaining the current common component. Lagged idiosyncratic CDS returns are also significant in explaining the current idiosyncratic component of CDS returns for around 42% of the firms.

So far we have imposed symmetrical responses of CDS returns to positive and negative lagged equity returns. We now relax this constraint and allow positive lagged equity returns to bear a different coefficient to negative returns. We regress the common component of CDS returns for each firm on lags of itself, lagged positive equity market returns and lagged negative equity market returns. Market returns are proxied by the return on an equally weighted portfolio of the equities in our sample but our results are not sensitive to alternative proxies. Specifically, we use the following specification

$$r_{i,t}^{ccom} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r_{i,t-1}^{ccom} + \beta_2 r_{m,t-1}^{epos} + \beta_3 r_{m,t-1}^{eneg} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{ccom} \quad (3)$$

The results are reported in Table 5. For all 193 firms, the coefficient of common CDS returns on lagged positive equity market returns is negative and significantly different from zero. The cross-sectional average of the coefficient on lagged positive equity returns is -0.5.¹⁹ The coefficient on lagged negative equity returns is also generally negative, averaging -0.16, but is significant for just 106 firms (55% of the sample). The restriction that the coefficients on positive and negative equity returns are equal is rejected in 56 cases (29% of the sample) although in every case the coefficient on lagged positive equity returns is larger in absolute terms than the coefficient on negative returns. We obtain very similar results if we use total CDS returns as the dependent variable -- coefficient values barely change and while the coefficient on positive equity returns is statistically significant, that on negative equity market returns is not.

We also run a version of this equation using equally-weighted portfolio returns. For this portfolio equity returns are partitioned into negative and positive series, and we regress

¹⁹ If we use raw CDS returns rather than the common component the average coefficient is essentially unchanged (-0.56) although significance levels fall.

portfolio CDS returns on a lagged dependent variable and lagged positive and negative portfolio equity returns series. We estimate the equation:

$$r_{m,t}^c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r_{m,t-1}^c + \beta_2 r_{m,t-1}^{epos} + \beta_3 r_{m,t-1}^{eneg} + \varepsilon_{m,t}^c \quad (4)$$

The coefficients on both positive and negative equity returns are significantly negative, though only marginally so in the case of negative returns (see the last row of Table 5). The absolute value of coefficient is much larger for positive returns than negative returns (-0.49 compared with -0.17) and equality of these coefficients is rejected. This pattern is also robust to the inclusion of contemporaneous partitioned equity returns in regression (4). The coefficients on contemporaneous positive and negative equity returns are -0.59 and -0.65, respectively, and the restriction that these are equal cannot be rejected at the five percent level. However, the coefficients on lagged positive and negative equity returns are -0.52 and -0.18 and a test of equality of these coefficients has a p-value of 0.019.

3.4 *The lead-lag relationship, informational asymmetries and hedging demand*

We have so far established three robust sets of results: i) the equity markets leads the CDS market in price discovery but this lead is specific to ii) common news, and, iii) positive news.

The presence of lead-lag relationships across markets documented in sections 3.1-3.3 seems at odds with market efficiency. Moreover, the news-specific nature of the lead-lags demonstrated in sections 3.2-3.3 rules out many standard explanations such as risk or market imperfections such as transactions cost since these would be expected to apply be regardless of the type of news.²⁰ Hilscher, Pollet and Wilson (2011) for example, argue that the CDS lag reflects a separating equilibrium where informed traders only trade in equities due to high

²⁰ McQueen, Pinegar and Thorley (1996) also emphasise this point in their discussion of asymmetric cross serial correlations for large and small cap stock returns.

bid-ask spreads in CDS markets. This explanation is not consistent with our findings that firm-specific and negative equity market news is priced approximately equally rapidly by both markets.²¹

While relatively unexplored in the finance literature, asymmetric adjustment of prices to changes in fundamentals is a frequent phenomenon in goods markets, termed “rockets and feathers” (Bacon, 1991). For example, in a study of 242 goods markets, Peltzman (2000) finds that in two-thirds of the markets the upward adjustment of prices in response to a positive (cost) shock is faster than the downward response of prices to a negative shock of similar magnitude. Prices thus rise like rockets but fall like feathers. While smacking of collusive actions by intermediaries, such price setting behaviour is consistent with profit-maximizing behaviour of imperfectly competitive intermediaries who face customers that are rational but only partially-informed (Tappata, 2009). In most goods markets the intermediary buys in wholesale markets against well-informed participants but sells in retail markets to consumers that are less informed about the nature of costs in the market. Since search costs prevent consumers from locating the lowest available price for the good, intermediaries can set relatively high prices following cost reductions, exploiting their market power and extracting rent. When costs rise, conversely, they immediately pass on these increases to consumers and so prices rise accordingly.

Such behaviour has recently also been documented in the finance literature. Green, Li and Schürhoff (2010) find that there is an asymmetric response by U.S. municipal bond yields to Treasury bond yield shocks. They show that muni bond prices rapidly rise when Treasury bonds prices rise yet they fall very slowly following a drop in T-bond prices. Green et al. argue that asymmetries in the clientele in muni bonds – with the buy side dominated by retail

²¹ The relatively good ability of the CDS market in pricing negative (equity) news may arise from short-selling constraints in the equity market. However, short-selling constraints cannot explain the differential response to common and idiosyncratic news and are also inconsistent with evidence provided later in this section.

customers while the sell side includes both retail and institutional sellers – are behind these results. They translate the search costs faced by retail consumers in goods markets into information asymmetries in asset markets such that the sell side is, on average, better informed than the buy side due to the presence of informed institutions in the former.

As we have demonstrated, the CDS market displays similar pricing behaviour. In the remainder of the paper we test whether the rockets and feathers hypothesis can explain our results. The hypothesis relies on there being an asymmetry in the clientele faced by dealers on different sides of the market, with one side likely to be less informed than the dealer and the participants on the other side of the market. We will argue below that while the CDS market is dominated by institutional traders, there is a class of customer present predominantly on the protection-buying side of the market – credit risk hedgers – who are also likely to be less focussed than other participants on general macroeconomic conditions.

We test two implications of the rockets and feathers hypothesis. First, the larger the market share of the relatively uninformed participants, the longer the CDS market lag as dealers can exploit their market power to a greater extent. Since we argue the relatively uninformed are likely to be credit risk hedgers, we relate the magnitude of the CDS market's lag in the cross-section to several proxies for hedging demand. Second, if information asymmetries are behind the lead-lag relationships then longer CDS market lags should be observed when information asymmetries are high. To examine this prediction, we analyze the impact of variations in two types of information asymmetries across time on the lead-lag.

3.4.1 The lead-lag relation and the demand for hedging credit risks

A key difference between equity and CDS markets arises from different motivations for trading in these markets and (ultimately related) the types of investors that are active in these markets. Equity markets are characterized by a wide group of investors – private investors and most types of institutional investors trade equities – and the motives for trading are manifold. Furthermore, investors are, on average, equally active on both the buy and sell side of the equity market. There is no pronounced asymmetry in clientele in equity markets.

Credit derivatives markets are much more limited in scope. Participants in this market are almost exclusively institutional investors, with banks forming the largest group: 60% of CDS protection in 2006 was bought by banks, 28% by hedge funds and 6% by insurance companies (source: BBA, 2006). Besides speculative trading, a key motive for banks taking CDS positions is to hedge (about one third of their credit derivatives positions are held in the loan book). This hedging demand is largely passive as it is determined by the lending business of banks, which is governed by medium-to-long term considerations. The importance of the hedging motive in CDS markets creates a natural asymmetry.²²

We hypothesise that the trading desks of banks and other potentially well-informed speculators both buy and sell credit protection through CDS contracts. However, the credit risk management (CRM) desks of banks concentrate their trading on just one side of the market, buying credit protection. Due to the information generated by their banks' lending activities, they are possibly well-informed about firm-specific news (as discussed by Acharya and Johnson, 2007) but we argue that they may be relatively uninformed with respect to credit risk implications of market-wide information.²³ One explanation for the CRM desk's lack of focus on market-wide information may be that it considers its bank to be

²² Banks are the by far largest (net) buyers of protection in the single-name CDS market. At the end of 2010 their net protection level was \$443bn; the second largest net-buyers were insurance and financial guaranty firm with a net protection of \$43bn (source: OTC derivative statistics).

²³ Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that private information about lending is first revealed by banks in CDS markets. This leakage could come through either the trading desks or the risk management desks of banks.

(independently) hedged against broad market movements, leaving the desk free to concentrate on managing firm-specific risks.

The presence of a large group of uninformed participants in a market ought not have important efficiency implications if dealers are competitive. However, CDS dealers have market power for at least two reasons. First, the CDS market is a bilateral over the counter market with no centralised quote disclosure mechanism. As there is no central counterparty system, counterparties need to enter into an ISDA Master Agreement before they can trade against each other. It is unlikely that hedgers enter into agreements with all dealers and hence they are limited in who they can trade against at any point in time. Second, protection bought on Firm X from Bank A is different from protection bought on Firm X from Bank B since the probability of joint default of Firm X and the protection writing bank differs.²⁴

There is therefore a degree of product differentiation across dealers. Product differentiation has been identified as a contributory factor to asymmetric price adjustment in goods markets.

The consequences of information asymmetry across participants and a less than fully competitive dealer networks are as follows. When firm-specific news arrives, all participants in the CDS market are well informed. They can thus not be exploited by market makers, resulting in an efficient pricing in the CDS market. When macro news occurs, hedgers tend to be relatively less well informed. CDS prices will still be efficient in the case of bad news, as in this case it is in the interest of market makers to pass on the higher cost of protection to the hedgers. However, in the case of good economic news, market makers can exploit their informational advantage vis-à-vis hedgers and delay lowering the cost of protection. Pricing in the CDS market then becomes inefficient.

²⁴ Arora, Gandhi and Longstaff (2010) show that these risk differences are priced in CDS markets.

If this explanation has any bearing, we would expect the CDS lag in the presence of good news to depend on the hedging demand for a firm's credit risk.²⁵ In particular, if there is no hedging demand for a specific firm, the response of CDS prices to good and bad news ought to be equivalent. The higher the demand by hedgers, the slower the response is when good news occurs, although there ought not be much cross-sectional variation in the response to bad news.²⁶ We therefore next study whether various proxies of hedging demand can explain cross-sectional variations in the lead-lag to good and bad equity market news.²⁷

We consider four proxies for hedging demand. The first is the outstanding debt of a firm. The higher the debt of the firm, the higher should be the demand for hedging. We measure debt by the (log of) the average total outstanding long-term debt of a firm, which we extract from Compustat at a quarterly frequency. Second, we proxy hedging demand with the firm's riskiness. The idea behind this is that the more likely is default, the higher is the demand for hedging. We measure risk with the (log of) the numerical long-term S&P credit rating variable (whereby a AAA rating translates to 1, AA to 2 etc).²⁸ We compute a time-weighted average rating level for each firm in the cross-section. Third, we also include a variable that captures the likelihood that hedging demands are changing, measured by the (log of) the standard deviation of CDS returns in the sample. This captures the idea that a firm that has a highly varying risk of default may require more frequent adjustments in trading positions than a firm with relatively constant risks. Hedging-motivated trading should be more

²⁵ Ideally, we would like to take account of the activities of both hedgers and speculators, since our explanation suggests that it is the importance of uninformed hedgers *relative* to informed speculators which impedes price discovery in the face of good market-wide news. Unfortunately, we have no reliable proxy for speculative activity in CDS markets at the individual firm level.

²⁶ Alternatively, one may look whether a firm's lead-lag is related to the actual trading of banks in the firm's CDS. However, data on banks' CDS positions on a firm-basis are not available.

²⁷ There may also be variations in hedging demand over time. In particular, we would expect higher hedging demand during times of crises. This is consistent with our findings in Section 3.1 that the equity-CDS lead-lag is higher during the crisis of 2007-2008.

²⁸ It might be argued that risk increases demand for trading in the CDS of a firm generally (and regardless of whether it is for speculative or hedging purposes). However, in this case we would expect the lead-lag and the asymmetries to decrease in firm risk as more trading should increase the efficiency of the CDS market.

important for volatile firms and should result in a more pronounced CDS lag. Finally, we expect hedging demand to vary by industry. In particular, especially towards the end of our sample period, there was a high demand for hedging the risks of exposure to financial institutions. We should thus see a larger lag for CDS prices of firms in the financial services industry.

We study the cross-sectional relation between a firm's equity lead and hedging demand by relating the coefficients obtained from regressions of CDS returns on lagged positive equity returns to the various hedging proxies:

$$Lag_i^{pos} = \alpha + \beta Z_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (5)$$

In this equation Z refers to the set of hedging proxies (plus firm size as a general control) and the dependent variable is the coefficient on lagged positive equity returns estimated in the first stage regression. We estimate equation (5) using weighted least squares since the dependent variable is an estimated coefficient. Weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the coefficient estimates in the first-stage regression.

The first column of Table 6 reports results with the coefficients on lagged positive equity market news as dependent variable. Long term debt has a negative coefficient and is very significant, consistent with larger passive hedging demand leading to a stronger lead-lag (recall that a large negative coefficient indicates a more pronounced lag for the CDS market). The coefficient on market capitalisation is positively signed and of approximately equal magnitude to that on debt, suggesting that leverage is a determinant of the coefficient. Rating – a proxy of firm risk – is far from significance with a p-value 0.57. This may be because ratings are only an imperfect measure of firm risk. It may also reflect that our debt variable (in a regression also controlling for firm size) already partially captures hedging demand driven by firm risk. The standard deviation of CDS returns has the expected negative sign

and is very significant. From the industry dummies only that for the financial services industry is significant at the five per cent level, and it has also the expected negative sign. The results from this regressions are thus supportive of the hedging demand component of the rockets and feathers hypothesis. However, we can exploit this setting further. The hedging demand hypothesis suggests that the lag with respect to positive stock market news should be related to hedging proxies, but the lag following negative news should not. The second column in Table 6 reports the results from similar regressions but with the coefficient on the CDS response to lagged negative equity news (Lag^{neg}) as dependent variable. We see that there is no longer significance for any of the hedging proxies. The financial industry dummy is marginally significant but the coefficient is now positive. It is not obvious what could explain the positive sign but the switch of the sign indicates that the lag of CDS returns in this industry is stronger with respect to positive than to negative news, consistent with the influence of hedging demand.

In the third column we use the difference between coefficients on positive and negative news ($Lag^{pos} - Lag^{neg}$) for each firm as the dependent variable. As can be seen, the results closely follow those seen for positive news. Finally, we report results in column four using the coefficient on lagged idiosyncratic equity returns from a regression of idiosyncratic CDS returns on lagged idiosyncratic equity and CDS returns as dependent variable. Our proxies for hedging demand are unrelated to cross-sectional variation in this coefficient – supporting the idea that hedgers are well informed in the event of firm news.

These results further corroborate the idea that the lead-lag relationship and its asymmetry are driven by passive hedging demands which allow CDS dealers to maintain high protection prices only when they have an informational advantage.

3.4.2 *The lead-lag relation and information asymmetries*

The rockets and feathers hypothesis relies on participants on one side of the market being, on average, less informed about the true value of the asset than the dealers and the participants on the other side. We have established that cross-sectional variation in proxies for hedging demand are correlated with the magnitude of the CDS market's lag in the face of good equity market news. In this section we test whether time-series variations in the level of information asymmetry also drive the magnitude of the lag.

Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2011) argue that an important economic announcement ought to resolve uncertainty. Hence, information asymmetries ought to be high immediately prior to this news announcement, and lead-lags should be relatively large. Our previous results suggest that macroeconomic rather than firm-specific information is important in explaining the equity lead over the CDS market. Consequently, we focus on three key U.S. announcements: the release of advanced GDP estimates, the employment situation announcement (which includes non-farm payroll figures), and the producer price index release.²⁹ We construct three indicator variables: *DAY* takes the value of one on the day that one of these announcements was made (and zero otherwise); *PRE* takes the value of one on the day immediately prior to an announcement (and zero otherwise); *NONE* takes the value of one if the other two indicator variables both equal zero (and is zero otherwise).³⁰ Since the previous results suggest that good news is critical to understanding the lagged response of the CDS market we interact these three indicators with the lagged positive component of the return on an equally-weighted portfolio of equity returns. The lagged negative component of

²⁹ In some months the consumer price index was announced before the producer price index. In these months we use the day of the consumer price index release.

³⁰ In the few instances where announcements occur on successive days, *PRE* takes the value of one only on the day prior to the first announcement.

equity returns is included but is not interacted with the indicator variables.³¹ We run the following regression:

$$r_{m,t}^c = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PRE_t \times r_{m,t-1}^{epos} + \alpha_2 DAY_t \times r_{m,t-1}^{epos} + \alpha_3 NONE_t \times r_{m,t-1}^{epos} + \alpha_4 r_{m,t-1}^{eneg} + \alpha_5 r_{m,t-1}^c + \varepsilon_{m,t}^c \quad (6)$$

If information asymmetries are important in explaining the magnitude of the CDS market's lag behind the equity market then we would expect $\alpha_1 < \alpha_3 < \alpha_2$ since the coefficient on lagged good equity market performance should be more negative than usual on days immediately preceding announcements, and less negative than usual on announcement days.³²

Coefficient point estimates reported in Table 7 are supportive of the hypothesised relationship in that the coefficient orderings are correct, and all three coefficients are significantly negative suggesting that CDS returns are slow to incorporate good news irrespective of information asymmetries. However, the test of equality between the three coefficients cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels as the standard errors on these coefficients are relatively large.³³ To increase the power of the test we pool data on individual firms and rerun the regression.³⁴ Again, the coefficient estimates are supportive of the hypothesis and the p-value of the equality of coefficients restriction is just 0.06. We interpret these results as (weakly) confirming that information asymmetries lie at the heart of the CDS market's lag behind the equity market.

³¹ Interaction terms with the negative component are insignificant when included.

³² The uninteracted indicator variables are each far from significant when added to equation (6).

³³ The standard errors on all three coefficients are larger than the standard error on the single coefficient on lagged positive equity market returns reported in the final row of Table 5, particularly for the relatively infrequently occurring announcement day dummy.

³⁴ Pooling in this way risks reducing power as the cross-sectional variation in coefficients on lagged equity market news is large. An alternative approach to improve the precision of the estimates of β_1 and β_2 might be to increase the number of announcements included in the analysis. However this risks pooling important macroeconomic releases with less important ones, which reduces our ability to discriminate between days with high and low information asymmetries.

Our second time-series based test is also derived from Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2011). They reason that increased information asymmetry will result in widening bid-ask spreads and decreased liquidity in the lead market – equities in our case. Increases in the bid-ask spreads for equities then predict slower adjustment of CDS returns to (positive) stock market returns.⁴⁰ We measure stock-level illiquidity using the daily proportional bid-ask spread on each firm in our sample (sourced from CRSP) and construct a daily equally-weighted average spread across stocks (denoted SP). We interact SP_t with positive and negative components of equity market returns, and include these interactions as additional regressors in portfolio-level regressions:

$$r_{m,t}^c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 r_{m,t-1}^{epos} + \beta_2 r_{m,t-1}^{eneg} + \beta_3 r_{m,t-1}^{epos} \times SP_{t-1} + \beta_4 r_{m,t-1}^{eneg} \times SP_{t-1} + \beta_5 r_{m,t-1}^c + \varepsilon_{m,t} \quad (7)$$

Results are reported in Table 8 for portfolio CDS returns and for pooled individual returns. The coefficients on the interaction of spreads with positive equity market movements are negative and statistically significant, supporting the idea that information leading to widening equity spreads and a rising equity market is incorporated into CDS prices with a relatively long lag. Indeed these results suggest that it is not the direction of news per se that drives the asymmetry since restricting the coefficients on lagged positive and negative equity market to be equal movements is not rejected and barely alters the goodness of fit. Rather it is the direction of news combined with relatively high levels of asymmetric information that drive the asymmetry in the lead-lag relationship. Conversely, the coefficients on the interaction of spreads with negative equity news are significantly positive, although the coefficient magnitude is much smaller than for positive news. This suggests that bad news actually reduces the lag of the CDS market.

⁴⁰ Note that a negative correlation between equity market illiquidity and the magnitude of the lagged response of CDS returns would be suggested by Barberis and Shleifer's (2003) model in which random liquidity demands with systematic components are traded first in large cap stocks and later in other assets. Such liquidity trading would decrease equity market illiquidity while increasing the magnitude of the lead-lag relationship. This could be viewed as an alternative hypothesis to the one we propose.

This sub-section has focussed on demonstrating that information asymmetries lie behind the equity market lead over the CDS market. In line with the rockets and feathers hypothesis we show that at times of high information asymmetry, such as immediately prior to important macroeconomic announcements or when market-wide stock bid-ask spreads are high and the news is positive, the stock market's lead is maximised. Conversely, when asymmetries are low, the lead is small. Indeed most of the lead-lag relationship between equities and CDS appears to be driven by information asymmetries around good market-wide news. Bad economic news is quite rapidly priced in both markets.

4. Conclusions

This paper has analyzed lead-lag patterns in equity and CDS markets. Using a large dataset we have documented a strong and robust advantage of the equity market over the CDS market in pricing new information. We have also documented that this advantage is mainly due to the pricing of aggregate and positive information in the equity market. A potential explanation for this is the presence of institutional investors with hedging demands in the CDS market. While these investors may be well informed about news specific to the firms in their portfolio, they may behave relatively passively in the advent of macro news. Dealers can exploit their local market power following good equity market news and maintain relatively high CDS prices since hedgers are not fully informed about the fall in the true price of protection. Conversely, after bad equity market news, CDS prices rise much more rapidly since it is in the dealers' best interest to raise prices for protection buyers.

Consistent with this hypothesis we have shown that the lead-lag is stronger for firms for which there is larger hedging demand. We have also presented evidence in favour of the pricing advantage of the equity market being related to informational asymmetries, as the

equity-lead is more pronounced at times of higher macroeconomic uncertainty (as measured by days prior to macroeconomic announcements and high bid-ask spreads). By contrast, our evidence does not lend support to alternative explanations of the lead-lag that are consistent with efficient markets.

Our paper strikes a negative note on the efficiency of CDS markets. CDS markets are widely considered to be the most efficient means of pricing credit risk. As such, one would expect them to do also relatively well compared with equity markets. However, our results show that this is not the case. We find a very strong lead for equity markets. This lead is robust to dividing the sample along many dimensions (firm risk, firm size, industry and sample period). Perhaps most disturbingly, the lead arises from supposedly easy-to-price economy-wide information, such as the equity-market factor. At this moment it should also be recalled that we have centred our sample on the firms with the most liquid CDS contracts, thus effectively biasing us against finding inefficiencies in the CDS market. Our analysis indicates that this inefficiency, at least partly, is caused by the presence of institutional investors with a passive demand for hedging in CDS markets.

This suggests that the composition of investors in a market can have important implications for pricing inefficiencies, especially where some classes of investor are informed (or uninformed) about certain types of news. More research in this area seems warranted – in particular understanding whether the pricing properties of other markets and assets (for example, CDS versus bond markets or large versus small firm stocks) can also be linked to the presence (or lack) of certain investor groups.

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics

This table provides summary statistics of the key returns series used in the paper. The sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm), and there are 193 firms in the data set. Figures in rows denoted Autocorrelation 1, 2 and 3 give autocorrelations with one, two and three lags. Figures in rows denoted Cross-autocorrelation 1, 2 and 3 give correlations between the time t -dated returns of the asset in that column and returns of the other asset at times $t-1$, $t-2$ and $t-3$. Statistics are calculated from the pooled data set.

	Equity returns	CDS returns
Mean	-0.0003	0.0014
25 th percentile	-0.0090	-0.0098
75 th percentile	0.0091	0.0095
Standard Deviation	0.0238	0.0351
Skew	-6.1305	2.4295
Autocorrelation 1	0.0239	0.2137
Autocorrelation 2	-0.0530	0.1106
Autocorrelation 3	-0.0093	0.0377
Cross-correlation	-0.1886	-0.1886
Cross-autocorrelation 1	-0.0145	-0.1487
Cross-autocorrelation 2	-0.0235	-0.0255
Cross-autocorrelation 3	-0.0089	-0.0310

Table 2

Bivariate VAR Results

The table reports the results of a bivariate vector autoregression of daily equity and CDS returns with one lag. The relevant dependent variable is given in the first column of each row. The first two rows report average results (coefficient values and R^2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of the number of firms with coefficients significant at the 5% level. The latter is also expressed as a percentage of the total sample of 193 firms. The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is zero. The remaining rows report pooled regression results. OLS results use standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Pooled regressions report p-values based on standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and double clustered by day and by firm. The full sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm). In the lower half of panel A the equity (CDS) equation in the VAR is augmented with contemporaneous CDS (equity) returns. In panel C, the pre-crisis period runs from 1st January 2004 through end June 2007 (877 observations per firm) and the crisis period runs from start August 2007 to the end of the sample (308 observations per firm).

	Lagged equity returns		Lagged CDS returns		R2
	Coefficient (p-val)	Count significant (% signif.)	Coefficient (p-val)	Count significant (% signif.)	
Panel A:					
Individual firms					
Equity returns	-0.025 (0.648)	20 (10.4%)	-0.001 (0.977)	12 (6.2%)	0.008
CDS returns	-0.201 (0.011)	149 (77.2%)	0.197 (0.001)	157 (81.3%)	0.076
Pooled firms					
Equity returns	0.021 (0.517)		-0.007 (0.582)		0.001
CDS returns	-0.166 (0.000)		0.191 (0.000)		0.057
Individual firms with contemporaneous 'other asset' returns					
Equity returns	-0.051 (0.392)	43 (22.3%)	0.029 (0.424)	47 (24.4%)	0.054
CDS returns	-0.208 (0.023)	154 (79.8%)	0.196 (0.001)	157 (81.3%)	0.118
Pooled firms with contemporaneous 'other asset' returns					
Equity returns	0.000 (0.998)		0.018 (0.161)		0.036
CDS returns	-0.160 (0.000)		0.190 (0.000)		0.091
Panel B:					
Credit rating					
AAA-A					
Equity returns	0.002 (0.946)		-0.003 (0.829)		0.000
CDS returns	-0.240 (0.000)		0.150 (0.000)		0.050
BBB-B					
Equity returns	-0.008		-0.004		0.000

	(0.677)	(0.785)	
CDS returns	-0.162 (0.000)	0.228 (0.000)	0.077
Size			
Largest 25%			
Equity returns	0.111 (0.398)	-0.014 (0.587)	0.014
CDS returns	-0.140 (0.193)	0.158 (0.000)	0.037
Middle 50%			
Equity returns	-0.015 (0.510)	-0.000 (0.974)	0.002
CDS returns	-0.189 (0.000)	0.200 (0.000)	0.064
Smallest 25%			
Equity returns	0.002 (0.885)	-0.014 (0.263)	0.003
CDS returns	-0.150 (0.000)	0.222 (0.000)	0.077
<hr/>			
Panel C:			
Pre-crisis			
Equity returns	0.006 (0.590)	-0.004 (0.388)	0.000
CDS returns	-0.147 (0.000)	0.166 (0.000)	0.037
Crisis period			
Equity returns	0.027 (0.573)	-0.005 (0.837)	0.001
CDS returns	-0.166 (0.002)	0.210 (0.000)	0.075
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Table 3**Portfolio Bivariate VAR results**

The table reports the results of a bivariate vector autoregression of daily equity and CDS equally weighted portfolio returns with one lag. The relevant dependent variable is given in the first column of each row. All estimates are computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The full sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm). In panel C, the pre-crisis period runs from 1st January 2004 through end June 2007 (877 observations per firm) and the crisis period runs from start August 2007 to the end of the sample (308 observations per firm).

	Lagged Equity Returns	Lagged CDS Returns	R²
	Coefficient (pval)	Coefficient (pval)	
Panel A: All firms			
Equity returns	-0.027 (0.599)	0.024 (0.612)	0.003
CDS returns	-0.306 (0.000)	0.408 (0.000)	0.279
Panel B: By industry			
Basic Materials: Equity returns	-0.059 (0.167)	0.009 (0.800)	0.004
CDS returns	-0.150 (0.000)	0.427 (0.000)	0.228
Consumer Goods: Equity returns	0.034 (0.491)	0.047 (0.266)	0.003
CDS returns	-0.279 (0.000)	0.367 (0.000)	0.246
Cons. Services: Equity returns	0.007 (0.885)	0.045 (0.200)	0.005
CDS returns	-0.330 (0.000)	0.419 (0.000)	0.274
Financials: Equity returns	0.015 (0.877)	0.007 (0.888)	0.000
CDS returns	-0.324 (0.000)	0.299 (0.000)	0.205
Health Care: Equity returns	-0.029 (0.568)	-0.002 (0.956)	0.001
CDS returns	-0.131 (0.020)	0.410 (0.000)	0.193
Industrials: Equity returns	-0.049 (0.222)	0.023 (0.524)	0.005
CDS returns	-0.322 (0.000)	0.358 (0.000)	0.211
Oil & Gas: Equity returns	-0.033 (0.513)	0.023 (0.733)	0.002
CDS returns	-0.106 (0.004)	0.508 (0.000)	0.295
Technology: Equity returns	0.001 (0.976)	0.018 (0.638)	0.001
CDS returns	-0.282 (0.000)	0.400 (0.000)	0.240
Utilities: Equity returns	-0.020 (0.738)	-0.009 (0.805)	0.001
CDS returns	-0.241 (0.005)	0.516 (0.000)	0.323

Panel C: All firms

Pre-crisis

Equity returns	0.049 (0.194)	0.017 (0.530)	0.003
CDS returns	-0.226 (0.000)	0.571 (0.000)	0.393

Crisis period

Equity returns	-0.057 (0.443)	0.044 (0.551)	0.010
CDS returns	-0.349 (0.000)	0.318 (0.000)	0.236

Table 4
Factor VAR Results

The table reports the results of vector autoregressions of daily factor decomposed equity and CDS returns with one lag. The table reports average results (coefficient values and R2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of the number of firms with coefficients significant at the 5% level. The latter is also expressed as a percentage of the total sample of 193 firms. The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is zero. In panel A firm-level equity and CDS returns are decomposed into common and idiosyncratic components based on principal components analysis. Specifically, the first three principal components are extracted from the equity returns of the 193 firms. The equity returns of each firm are then regressed on these three principal components, fitted values are saved as the common component of equity returns and residuals are saved as the idiosyncratic component. A similar approach is taken for CDS returns. These four components form the VAR. The relevant dependent variable is given in the first column and the explanatory variables are identified by the column headings. In panel B a similar decomposition is performed for equity returns using three Fama-French factors. CDS returns are not decomposed and the trivariate VAR is composed of the common equity return component, the idiosyncratic equity component and the total CDS return. In Panel C, the equity decomposition is performed using just one factor, alternately the first principal component, the equally weighted average return from the 193 equities, and the Fama-French market factor. Each row in Panel C reports the results of regression with the total CDS return as dependent variable. All VAR estimates are computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The full sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm).

	Lagged equity returns				Lagged CDS returns				R2
	Common returns		Idiosyncratic returns		Common returns		Idiosyncratic returns		
	Coefficient (p-val)	Count signif. (% signif.)	Coefficient (p-val)	Count signif. (% signif.)	Coefficient (p-val)	Count signif. (% signif.)	Coefficient (p-val)	Count signif. (% signif.)	
Panel A: PCA factors									
Equity Common	-0.026 (0.632)	0 (0.0%)	0.001 (0.989)	14 (7.3%)	0.027 (0.553)	0 (0.0%)	-0.001 (0.947)	12 (6.2%)	0.009
Equity Idiosyncratic	0.004 (0.954)	30 (15.5%)	-0.020 (0.677)	31 (16.1%)	-0.005 (0.896)	20 (10.4%)	-0.012 (0.603)	22 (11.4%)	0.017
CDS Common	-0.279 (0.000)	173 (89.6%)	-0.012 (0.816)	17 (8.8%)	0.451 (0.000)	193 (100.0%)	-0.002 (0.947)	30 (15.5%)	0.293

CDS Idiosyncratic	-0.009 (0.922)	19 (9.8%)	-0.058 (0.459)	28 (14.5%)	0.005 (0.940)	21 (10.9%)	0.078 (0.171)	81 (42.0%)	0.029
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Panel B: Fama-French factors

Equity Common	-0.086 (0.141)	57 (29.5%)	0.010 (0.787)	15 (7.8%)	0.005 (0.765)	1 (0.5%)			0.014
Equity Idiosyncratic	0.003 (0.962)	28 (14.5%)	-0.005 (0.917)	26 (13.5%)	-0.009 (0.652)	22 (11.4%)			0.015
CDS Total	-0.422 (0.001)	178 (92.2%)	-0.086 (0.354)	40 (20.7%)	0.185 (0.001)	151 (78.2%)			0.086

Panel C: Market factor

Principal component #1	-0.470 (0.000)	184 (95.3%)	-0.065 (0.480)	31 (16.1%)	0.182 (0.002)	150 (77.7%)			0.089
Average equity return	-0.482 (0.000)	184 (95.3%)	-0.064 (0.483)	31 (16.1%)	0.181 (0.002)	149 (77.2%)			0.090
Fama- French market factor	-0.443 (0.001)	179 (92.7%)	-0.085 (0.350)	48 (24.9%)	0.184 (0.002)	152 (78.8%)			0.087

Table 5**Asymmetric Responses to Positive and Negative Equity Market News**

This table reports results of regressions of CDS returns on lagged equity market returns partitioned into positive and negative components. Lagged CDS returns are also included in the regressions. The first row of the table summarizes results using common components of firm CDS returns as dependent variables. The common components were extracted using the first three principal components of CDS returns. This row reports average results (coefficient values and R2 values) across the 193 individual firms together with a count of the number of firms with coefficients or test statistics significant at the 5% level. The latter is also expressed as a percentage of the total sample of 193 firms. The p-val figure is that resulting from a test that the average coefficient value is zero. The second row reports regression results using equally weighted portfolio CDS returns. Equity market returns are computed as the equally weighted equity market return for our sample of stocks. All estimates are computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm).

	Lagged positive equity market returns		Lagged negative equity market returns		Coefficient equality test	R2
	Coefficient (p-val)	Count signif. (% signif.)	Coefficient (p-val)	Count signif. (% signif.)	p-val (% signif.)	
Individual common CDS returns	-0.497 (0.000)	193 (100.0%)	-0.159 (0.092)	106 (54.9%)	0.121 (29.0%)	0.299
Portfolio CDS returns	-0.489 (0.000)		-0.168 (0.058)		0.043	0.286

Table 6
Cross-Sectional Variation in Responses to Good and Bad News

The first two columns of this table reports results of cross-sectional regressions of estimated coefficients from row 2 of Table 5 on firm-specific variables. Specifically, the dependent variables are the estimated coefficient on lagged positive (negative) equity market returns from regressions of CDS returns on lags of itself, lagged positive equity market returns and lagged negative equity market returns. In the third column we use *Diff*, defined as the coefficient on positive news minus the coefficient on negative news, as a dependent variable. The final column uses the coefficient on lagged idiosyncratic equity returns from a regression of idiosyncratic CDS returns on lagged idiosyncratic equity and CDS returns. All estimates are computed using weighted least squares with robust standard errors. Weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the estimated coefficients from the first stage regression. Coefficient estimates are reported with associated p-values in parentheses.

	Total Returns		Idiosyncratic Returns	
	Positive news	Negative news	Diff	
Market Capitalization	0.0787 (0.000)	-0.0248 (0.148)	0.1151 (0.001)	-0.0058 (0.393)
Long Term Debt	-0.0885 (0.000)	0.0045 (0.765)	-0.1005 (0.001)	0.0093 (0.250)
Rating	0.0445 (0.571)	-0.0063 (0.910)	0.0873 (0.444)	-0.0133 (0.663)
Std. Dev. of CDS Returns	-0.4540 (0.000)	-0.0160 (0.810)	-0.3793 (0.025)	-0.0270 (0.583)
Consumer Goods	-0.0497 (0.439)	0.0892 (0.027)	-0.1422 (0.110)	-0.0104 (0.505)
Consumer Services	-0.0524 (0.456)	0.0856 (0.058)	-0.1460 (0.138)	-0.0133 (0.470)
Financials	-0.1904 (0.013)	0.1100 (0.069)	-0.3137 (0.014)	-0.0249 (0.326)
Health Care	0.1185 (0.115)	0.0732 (0.065)	0.0612 (0.536)	-0.0667 (0.027)
Industrials	-0.1174 (0.070)	0.0219 (0.594)	-0.1312 (0.152)	-0.0105 (0.535)
Oil & Gas	-0.0033 (0.963)	-0.1158 (0.011)	0.1091 (0.272)	0.0149 (0.455)
Technology	-0.1196 (0.104)	-0.0377 (0.440)	-0.0962 (0.371)	-0.0311 (0.239)
Utilities	0.0881 (0.250)	-0.0327 (0.506)	0.1186 (0.298)	-0.0014 (0.960)
R2	0.379	0.252	0.322	0.106

Table 7**Information Asymmetries and News Announcements**

The table reports results of regressions of CDS returns on lagged positive equity market returns interacted with three indicator variables. PRE takes the value 1 on days immediately prior to important macroeconomic announcements (and 0 otherwise), DAY takes the value of 1 on the day of macro announcements (and 0 otherwise) and NONE takes the value of 1 if both other indicator variables equal 0 (and 0 otherwise). Equity market returns are computed as the equally weighted equity market return for our sample of stocks. Lagged CDS returns and lagged negative equity market returns are also included in the regressions. Results are reported for equally weighted portfolio CDS returns and for pooled individual CDS returns. The final row reports the test statistic and p-value of the test that coefficients on the three interacted variables are equal. All estimates are computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The standard errors in the pooled regressions are also clustered at the firm level. The sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations per firm).

	Portfolio CDS Returns		Pooled Individual CDS Returns	
	Coefficient	(p-val)	Coefficient	(p-val)
Lagged positive equity market returns × PRE	-0.641	(0.000)	-0.297	(0.000)
Lagged positive equity market returns × NONE	-0.437	(0.001)	-0.153	(0.000)
Lagged positive equity market returns × DAY	-0.401	(0.032)	-0.111	(0.000)
Lagged negative equity market returns	-0.171	(0.054)	-0.159	(0.000)
Lagged CDS returns	0.421	(0.000)	0.193	(0.000)
R2	0.287		0.058	
Coefficient equality test	0.89	(0.410)	2.85	(0.060)

Table 8**Information Asymmetries and Illiquidity**

This table reports results of a regression of equally weighted portfolio CDS returns on the variables listed in the first column. The main innovation in this set of regressions is the inclusion of lagged equity market returns interacted with lagged average equity market bid-ask spreads. Equity market returns are computed as the equally weighted equity market return for our sample of stocks. Estimates are computed using OLS with standard errors robust to unspecified heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Coefficient estimates are reported with associated p-values in parentheses. The sample runs from 1st January 2004 through 14th October 2008 (1208 observations).

	Portfolio CDS Returns		Pooled Individual CDS Returns	
	Coefficient	(p-val)	Coefficient	(p-val)
Lagged positive equity market returns	-0.247	(0.044)	-0.387	(0.000)
Lagged negative equity market returns	-0.277	(0.007)	-0.477	(0.000)
Lagged positive equity market returns × lagged spreads	-1.244	(0.026)	-0.908	(0.001)
Lagged negative equity market returns × lagged spreads	0.334	(0.004)	0.428	(0.000)
Lagged CDS returns	0.420	(0.000)	0.182	(0.000)
R2	0.290		0.070	

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Appendix – List of Firms Analysed

Basic Materials	Liz Claiborne	Tjx Cos.	Wyeth	Kinder Morgan En.Ptns.
Alcoa	Newell Rubbermaid	Walt Disney		Marathon Oil
Ashland	Pepsico	Yum! Brands	Industrials	Parker Drilling
Commercial Mtls.	Pulte Homes		3m	Pioneer Ntrl.Res.
Cytec Inds.	Sara Lee	Financials	Arrow Electronics	Sunoco
Dow Chemical	Sears Holdings	Allstate	Avnet	
E I Du Pont De Nemours	Smithfield Foods	Ambac Financial	Boeing	Technology
Eastman Chemical	Stanley Works	American Express	Burl.Nthn.Santa Fe	Amkor Tech.
Intl. Paper	Standard Pacific	AIG	Caterpillar	CA
Monsanto	Toll Bros.	Aon	CSX	Centurytel
Newmont Mining	Tyson Foods	Berkshire Hathaway	Danaher	Computer Scis.
Nucor	Universal	Capital One Finl.	Dover	Corning
Olin	V F	Chubb	Emerson Electric	Dell
Praxair	Whirlpool	Cit Group	Fedex	Hewlett-Packard
Weyerhaeuser		CNA Financial	Goodrich	IBM
	Consumer Services	General Electric	Honeywell Intl.	Motorola
Consumer Goods	Autozone	Goldman Sachs Gp.	Lockheed Martin	Pitney-Bowes
Altria Group	Cardinal Health	Hartford Finl.Svs.Gp.	Masco	Sun Microsystems
Archer-Danls.-Midl.	Comcast	Lincoln Nat.	Meadwestvaco	Texas Insts.
Arvinmeritor	Costco Wholesale	Loews	Norfolk Southern	Xerox
Avon Products	Dillards	Marsh & McLennan	Raytheon 'B'	
Black & Decker	Gannett	Mbia	Republic Svs.	Utilities
Borgwarner	Home Depot	Metlife	Ryder System	Cms Energy
Brunswick	Interpublic Gp.	Mgic Investment	Sealed Air	Constellation En.
Campbell Soup	Penney Jc	Morgan Stanley	Sherwin-Williams	Dte Energy
Centex	Kohl's	PMJ Group	Temple Inland	Duke Energy
Coca Cola	Kroger	Prudential Finl.	Textron	Entergy
Coca Cola Ents.	Limited Brands	Radian Gp.	Union Pacific	Exelon
Conagra Foods	Lowe's Companies	SLM	United Parcel Ser.	Oneok
Constellation Brands	Marriott Intl.	Washington Mutual	Waste Man.	Pepco Holdings
Cooper Tire & Rub.	McDonalds	Wells Fargo & Co		Progress Energy
D R Horton	McKesson		Oil & Gas	Sempra En.
Ford Motor	Nordstrom	Health Care	Anadarko Petroleum	Teco Energy
Fortune Brands	Office Depot	Abbott Laboratories	Apache	Xcel Energy
General Mills	Omnicom Gp.	Amgen	Baker Hughes	
General Motors	Radioshack	Boston Scientific	Chesapeake Energy	
Johnson Controls	Safeway	Bristol Myers Squibb	Chevron	
Jones Apparel Group	Southwest Airlines	Humana	Conocophillips	
KB Home	Staples	Medtronic	Devon Energy	
Kellogg	Starwood Htls.& Rsts.	Merck & Co.	Diamond Offs.Drl.	
Kimberly-Clark	Supervalu	Pfizer	El Paso	
Kraft Foods	Target	Schering-Plough	Enterprise Prds.Ptns.Lp.	
Lear	Gap	Tenet Hlthcr.	Forest Oil	
Lennar	Time Warner	Unitedhealth Gp.	Hess	