Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 1996-11-19 Number: 96-172/8 Author-Name: Gerard van der Laan Author-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Author-Name: A.F. Tieman Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Title: Evolutionary Game Theory and the Modelling of Economic Behavior Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'De Economist', 1998, 146, 59-89.
Since the 1950's economists applied game theoretical concepts to a wide variety of economic problems. The Nash equilibrium concept has proven to be a powerful instrument in analyzing the outcome of economic processes. Since the late 1980's economists also show a growing interest in the application of evolutionary game theory. This paper discusses the main concepts of evolutionarygame theory and their applicability to economic issues. Whereas traditional game theory focusses on the static Nash equilibria as the possible outcomes of the game, evolutionary game theory teaches us to model explictly the behavior of individuals outside equilibrium. This may provide us with a better understanding of the dynamic forces within a society of interacting individuals. Classification-JEL: C62, D83 Keywords: noncooperative symmetric bimatrix game, evolutionary stable strategy, replicator dynamics, learning and imitation, metastrategy, stable population File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/96172.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 257173 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:19960172