Private Road Supply in Networks with Heterogeneous Users

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Abstract

We study different mixes of private and public supply of roads in a network with bottleneck congestion and heterogeneous users. There are two parallel links for one origin and destination pair and two groups of travellers, where the group with higher value of time also has higher schedule delay value. Previous scholars argued that as users become more heterogeneous, they benefit more from product differentiation, making private supply of roads more efficient. However, we find that local monopoly power might also increase. This may occur if one group prefers one road over the other as the
two offer different combinations of toll and travel delay. The private supplier can thus increase the toll on its link without worrying that the targeted travellers will move to the other link. This can undermine the efficiency of private supply of roads. The problem is especially severe with flat tolls. With queue-eliminating tolls, both types tend to travel on both roads, and competition remains relatively intense. Flat tolling is always worse for users than time-variant tolling as it has the higher generalized prices, and it also leads to a lower welfare.

Keywords: Congestion Pricing, Bottleneck Model, Heterogeneity, Private Supply

JEL codes: R41, R42, R48

1 Introduction

Interest in traffic congestion charging is increasing with fast urbanization (Hensher and Puckett (2007)), and private supply of roads is considered by many scholars as a viable complement to public supply of roads. Often mentioned reasons include a lack of public funds and commonly-believed higher operational efficiency of the private sector. However, the possibility of excessive pricing under market power calls for caution. The tradeoff is further complicated by user heterogeneity, where some people prefer a lower level of congestion at the cost of a higher toll, while others prefer a lower toll despite a higher level of congestion. When travellers’ preferences become more heterogeneous, on the one hand, product differentiation offered by different road providers makes travellers better off; on the other hand, different products become less close substitutes, and the increasing local monopoly power of the operator makes travellers worse off. We study the impact of such tradeoffs in various private, public and mixed regimes, using the bottleneck congestion model.

The key assumption of the bottleneck model is that congestion cost comes from time wasted waiting in traffic jams and schedule delays (i.e., the incon-
venience of arriving at the destination earlier or later than desired). People in general differ in their values of time and schedule delay costs, and because this has an important impact on the welfare effects of pricing, we incorporate heterogeneity into the analysis. This paper considers two groups of commuters, where one group has both a higher value of time and higher values of schedule delay than the other. We thus use ‘proportional heterogeneity’, as in Vickrey (1973) and Van den Berg and Verhoef (2011), where the relevant values of time and schedule delay vary in a fixed proportion over travellers. This type of heterogeneity could stem from differences in income, affecting the marginal utility of income, and therefore all relevant marginal valuations proportionately. In addition, we examine two kinds of tolls: a flat toll is constant over time, while a queue-eliminating toll continuously varies over time.

Our paper studies how different toll schemes result in different types of market structure equilibriums and thus different market performances. This leads to several new insights. With flat tolls, a pooling equilibrium, where both types of users travel on both roads, is neither socially nor commercially optimal. In fact commuters will travel fully separated where each groups travel on one road exclusively, or partially separated where one group prefers one road strictly while the other group travel on both roads. With more heterogeneity, it becomes even less likely that someone will switch to a different road. As a result, for competing suppliers on parallel links, local monopoly power increases with user heterogeneity. This can lower social welfare. With queue-eliminating tolls, a pooling equilibrium is optimal for both a social planner and for a profit-maximizing operator. Since both roads compete for both types of travellers, competition remains intense, and social welfare increases with user heterogeneity.

Our paper is related to three strands of literature. The first is on the combination of bottleneck congestion and user heterogeneity. Arnott et al. (1992) show that with fixed demand and a flat toll, a pooling equilibrium is better for the society under certain conditions. Yang and Meng (1998)
develop socially optimal variable tolls for a network with heterogenous users. Van den Berg and Verhoef (2011) assume continuous heterogeneity both in values of time and schedule delay, and study the welfare and distributional effects of queue-eliminating tolls. Cantos-Sánchez et al. (2011) examines the viability of a new road into Madrid city centre with heterogeneous users. We focus on the comparison in social welfare and distributional effect between a variety of public, private and mixed regimes.

The second strand is on private roads with bottleneck congestion and homogeneous users. Arnott et al. (1992) and de Palma and Lindsey (2002) demonstrate that private supply of roads generally enhances social welfare when congestion is severe. The efficiency is higher when both routes are tolled with time-varying queue-eliminating tolls. Our study shows, in addition, that with heterogeneity, a queue-eliminating toll is more likely than a flat toll to generate a pooling equilibrium and thereby promotes competition.

The final strand of literature is on static congestion and heterogeneous users. Edelson (1971) considers a monopolist private road with heterogeneous users, concluding that it may set a toll that is lower than socially optimal. Yang et al. (2002) consider a private monopolist operator in a network. Small and Yan (2001) and Verhoef and Small (2004) find that heterogeneity improves the performance of second-best and private regimes, as product differentiation can better cater for the specific preferences of each group. Competing private roads also generally offer different travel times and tolls, since differentiation raises profits Luski (1976); Calcott and Yao (2005). Yang and Huang (2004) and Holguín-Veras and Cetin (2009) study multiple vehicle classes in a network.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly explains the model setup. Section 3 derives, for both tolls, the optimal equilibrium for a welfare-maximizing social planner and a profit-maximizing monopolist operator in a network of two parallel links. For more complex ownership structures on the network, theoretical results are not clear-cut. Hence section 4 shows the simulation results for various ownership structures.
in the network, namely public, private and mixed supply of roads. Section 5 discusses the main limitations and concludes.

2 Model Setup

We assume there are two groups of travellers, denoted by \( i = h, l \), whose group size is \( N^i \). They have a group-specific inverse demand function, denoted by \( D^i(N^i) \), which is decreasing in \( N^i \). Two parallel links, denoted by \( j = 1, 2 \), serve one origin and destination pair. A link has a capacity of \( s_j \).

The bottleneck model assumes that people dislike waiting in traffic jams, and also dislike arriving either early or late for work. If a person’s desired arrival time is \( t^* \), but he arrives at work at time \( t \), the congestion cost consists of two parts. The first part is the time costs associated with waiting at the bottleneck, which is the product of value of time, denoted by \( \alpha \), and time spent waiting, denoted by \( T(t) \). The second part is the schedule delay costs. For people arriving early, the cost is the product of how early they arrive, measured by \( t - t^* \), and the schedule delay value of arriving early, denoted by \( \beta \). For people arriving late, the schedule delay cost is defined similarly, where \( \gamma \) denotes the schedule delay value of arriving late. In sum, the congestion cost for arriving at time \( t \) is:

\[
C(t) = \alpha T(t) + \begin{cases} 
\beta(t^* - t) & \text{if } t \leq t^* \\
\gamma(t - t^*) & \text{if } t > t^*
\end{cases}
\]

For ease of analysis, we assume the two groups have proportional values of time and schedule delay, i.e. \( \alpha_h = \beta_h = \gamma_h \) and \( \alpha^h > \alpha^l \). This implies that people with a higher value of time also have a higher value of schedule delay, and vice versa. Given that all values have the marginal utility of income in the denominator, this pattern could result from income differences for otherwise identical individuals (Van den Berg and Verhoef (2011)).
3 Theoretical Results

In this section, we study social welfare maximisation and monopolistic profit maximisation. The equilibrium characteristics of these two benchmark regimes carry over to more complex ownership structures, as shown later in the simulation section. We find that with flat tolls a pooling equilibrium, where both types of travellers use both roads, is neither optimal for a social planner nor for a monopolist. But with queue-eliminating tolls a pooling equilibrium is optimal for both types of operators.

In the remainder of this section, we will discuss flat tolls and queue-eliminating tolls respectively.

3.1 Flat Toll

A flat toll is constant over time. When the two types of travellers with proportional heterogeneity use the same link, they travel together in time, and cannot be distinguished by the time they enter. This is because the equilibrium growth rates of the queueing time of group $i$ are, $\frac{\beta_i}{\gamma_i}$ for early arrivals and $-\frac{\alpha_i}{\gamma_i}$ for late ones, and with proportional heterogeneity, these ratios are the same for both types of users. There is, therefore, no temporal separation between different types if they use the same link.

For social welfare and monopolistic profit maximization, we show why the pooling equilibrium, where both types of travellers use both links, is not optimal with a flat toll. We prove by contradiction. Starting with an optimal pooling equilibrium, social welfare or total revenue can be further increased.

Following conventions, we use the following compound reference parameter $\delta^i = \frac{\beta^i-\gamma^i}{\beta^i+\gamma^i}$. The congestion cost for group $i$ on link $j$, as derived in Van...
den Berg and Verhoef (2011), is:

\[ C^h_j = \delta^h \frac{N^h_j + N^l_j}{s_j} \]

\[ C^l_j = \delta^l \frac{N^h_j + N^l_j}{s_j} \]  

(1)

More travellers on a link leads to higher congestion costs. Both types experience the same delays over time, but bear different congestion costs depending on the type-specific parameter \( \delta^i \). The link-group-specific toll is \( \tau^i_j \) and the group-specific inverse demand functions is \( D^i(N^h) \).

A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, which is the total consumer willingness to pay minus the congestion costs. When both types travel on both roads, i.e. \( N^i_j > 0 \), the social welfare is as follows:

\[ SW = \int_0^{N^h_1+N^h_2} D^h(n)dn + \int_0^{N^l_1+N^l_2} D^l(n)dn \]

\[- C^h_1 N^h_1 - C^l_1 N^l_1 - C^h_2 N^h_2 - C^l_2 N^l_2 \]  

(2)

Using the first-order conditions for a pooling equilibrium, at the optimum, the traffic flow ratio of each group is equal to the link-capacity ratio, i.e. \( \frac{N^i_1}{N^i_2} = \frac{s_1}{s_2} \). For each group the congestion cost on both links are the same.

Starting from the above pooling equilibrium, we can increase social welfare further in two steps.

First we move a h type user from link 2 to link 1 and move a l type from link 1 to link 2. As a result, the social welfare remains the same. Keep moving travellers in this way, until we arrive at a partially separating equilibrium where one type travels on one road only and the other type travels on both roads.

Next we can remove one marginal h types from link 1 and keep her "at home", and add one l marginal types to link 2, then social welfare will in-

\(^1\)All h types travel on link 1 when initially \( N^h_2 < N^l_1 \), or all l types travel on link 2 when initially \( N^h_2 > N^l_1 \).
crease. This is because, the marginal social congestion cost of an extra h types on link 1 now exceeds the generalized price from the pooling equilibrium, while the opposite is true on the other link\(^2\).

So we have shown that a pooling equilibrium would not be optimal for a social planner.

The same logic applies to profit maximisation. Starting from a pooling equilibrium, the monopolistic profit can always be improved in two similar steps as in the social welfare maximisation problem. So a pooling equilibrium would also not be optimal for monopolistic profit maximisation.

The result, that with flat tolls a pooling equilibrium is neither socially nor commercially optimal, depends crucially on the assumption of proportional heterogeneity. For a more general heterogeneity structure, Arnott et al. (1992) derive conditions on the heterogeneity structure for a pooling equilibrium to be socially optimal. We also look at profit maximization.

### 3.2 Queue-Eliminating Tolls

A queue-eliminating toll varies over time so as to eliminate queueing. The initial level of the toll (i.e. a flat component paid by all drivers on top of the time-varying component) can be set by the road operator. If both groups use the same link, h types travel at the center of the peak, while l types travel at the tails under time-varying tolling. The toll rises at a rate \(\beta^i\) for early arrivals, and falls at a rate \(\gamma^i\) for late arrivals. A type h driver would find it attractive to move towards \(t^*\) at any moment where type l driver are in equilibrium. Reversely, a type l driver would move away from \(t^*\) when travelling with type h drivers. Hence, temporal separation will result under time-varying tolling.

For social welfare and monopoly profit maximisation, we show that a pooling equilibrium is optimal with a queue-eliminating toll. We only assume

\(^2\text{Mathematically, the partial derivatives of the social welfare function with respect to the new traffic flows have the following properties now: } \frac{\partial SW}{\partial N^T_1} < 0, \frac{\partial SW}{\partial N^T_2} < 0, \frac{\partial SW}{\partial N^L_1} > 0, \frac{\partial SW}{\partial N^L_2} > 0.\)
\[ \frac{\beta^h}{\tau^h} = \frac{\beta^l}{\tau^l} \text{, } \alpha^i > \beta^i \text{ and } \beta^h > \beta^l, \] so the following result not only applies to proportional heterogeneity, but also holds for more general heterogeneity.

The average congestion cost is (Van den Berg and Verhoef (2011)):

\[
C^h_j = \delta^h \frac{N^h_j}{2s_j} \\
C^l_j = \delta^l \frac{N^h_j}{s_j} + \delta^l \frac{N^l_j}{2s_j}
\] (3)

The factor \( \frac{1}{2} \) stems from the fact that the travel delay cost is fully replaced by tolls: not a social cost, but a transfer. The term containing \( N^h_j \) for \( l \) types reflects the additional schedule delay costs that \( l \) types face because the \( h \) types occupy the central peak.

When both types travel on both roads (all \( N^i_j > 0 \)), the social welfare is:

\[
SW = \int_0^{N^h_1 + N^h_2} D^h(n)dn + \int_0^{N^l_1 + N^l_2} D^l(n)dn \\
- C^h_1 N^h_1 - C^l_1 N^l_1 - C^h_2 N^h_2 - C^l_2 N^l_2
\] (4)

Using first order conditions for the pooling equilibrium, we find that the solution is \( \tau^l_j = 0 \). The Hessian matrix is negative definite, so the pooling equilibrium is the global maximum.

Similarly, we can prove that with queue-eliminating tolling, the profit maximising equilibrium is pooling with a group-specific \( \tau^i = \frac{\partial D^i(N^i)}{\partial N^i} N^i \). This is the conventional mark-up of a monopoly. The overall toll is the mark-up plus the time-variant marginal external cost. It is similar to static congestion (Small and Verhoef (2007)).

The result, that with queue-eliminating tolls a pooling equilibrium is optimal for both the social planner and the monopolist, does not depend on the assumption of proportional cost parameters. The logic can be applied to a general heterogeneity structure, and it stems from the notion that with eliminated queues, the best ordering of travellers is such that those with the
highest schedule delay value travel closest to the preferred arrival time on both bottlenecks.

In sum, for two parallel links and social welfare/monopolistic profit maximization, flat tolls and queue-eliminating tolls generate different equilibria, i.e. separating versus pooling. We will show in the next section that those differences remain for more complex ownership structures on the network. As a result, flat tolls and queue-eliminating tolls also have different implication for market structure and performance, which are interesting for both policy makers and practitioners. In addition, when different road operator interact with each other, sometimes Nash equilibrium does not exist and the results depend on the parameters used. So we will use simulations to examine more complex ownership structure on the network in the next section.

4 Simulation

To examine and compare more complex ownership structure on the network, such as public, private and mixed regimes, we use simulation. We consider the following seven regimes: free, public, monopoly, free-public, free-private, private-public and private-private. In the first three cases, one operator controls both links. The free regime, where both roads are free of tolling, is likely to be the status quo and a good starting point for comparison. The public regime aims to achieve the highest possible social welfare, and the efficiency of all other regimes can be evaluated against it. The monopoly regime aims to maximize joint profits, and can provide useful information for private supply of roads. However, in reality often only part of the network can be tolled, so it is important to also study the next two cases, where link 1 is left free of charge, but an operator on link 2 can charge a toll. We distinguish between a private and a public provider on link 2, because they have significantly different implications for travellers. Finally we analyse two competitive regimes, where the two roads are tolled by different operators, because competition is usually believed to increase efficiency. With competitive regimes, a private
operator sets a toll on link 1, and either a public or private operator offers a competing service on link 2.

The parameters we use are: $\alpha^h = 10.59$, $\beta^h = 6.45$, $\gamma^h = 25.16$, and $\alpha^l = 0.9$. This ensures that the ratios between the cost parameters are as in Small (1982), and the average value of time in the free regime is 10. The inverse demand function is linear, and is constructed to ensure that in the free regime, the price elasticity of demand is $-0.4$ for both groups, and the number of users is 1200 for $h$ types and 1500 for $l$ types. The capacity of link 1 is 4000 and that of link 2 is 8000.

In the simulation, we only consider link-specific tolls, $\tau_j$, not link-group-specific tolls. This is because when we cannot tell the groups apart, there can be an incentive compatibility problem of a link-group-specific toll, where a member of one group can pretend to belong to the other group. A link-specific toll is also easier to implement in real life than a link-group-specific toll, due to costly verification for user types, even if this were technically possible.

4.1 Simulation: Flat Toll

4.1.1 Flat Toll: Base Equilibrium

Table 1 shows the equilibrium values of the key factors in all seven regimes. Similar to the theoretical results, we observe mostly separating equilibria, where at least one of the two links is only used by one type of travellers.
Table 1: Flat Toll

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pricing Regime</th>
<th>Free</th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Monopoly</th>
<th>Free-Pub</th>
<th>Free-Priv</th>
<th>Priv-Pub</th>
<th>Priv-Priv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_1$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.74</td>
<td>19.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>10.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_2$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>18.97</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>11.03</td>
<td>9.32</td>
<td>12.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N^h_1$</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>6805</td>
<td>4370</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>6165</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N^h_2$</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>2737</td>
<td>2117</td>
<td>11367</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>3031</td>
<td>8520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N^l_1$</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10493</td>
<td>12272</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N^l_2$</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>11444</td>
<td>7015</td>
<td>3512</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10958</td>
<td>2727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi_1$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59446</td>
<td>83967</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64046</td>
<td>78388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Pi_2$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>118682</td>
<td>173175</td>
<td>52488</td>
<td>99265</td>
<td>130429</td>
<td>142976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CS^h$</td>
<td>173321</td>
<td>109583</td>
<td>50650</td>
<td>155512</td>
<td>116025</td>
<td>101794</td>
<td>87367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CS^l$</td>
<td>194986</td>
<td>113501</td>
<td>42642</td>
<td>169975</td>
<td>130528</td>
<td>104051</td>
<td>85216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$SW$</td>
<td>368307</td>
<td>401213</td>
<td>350434</td>
<td>377975</td>
<td>345818</td>
<td>400321</td>
<td>393947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Toll($\tau_j$), traffic flow($N^i_j$), seller’s profit($\Pi_j$), consumer surplus($CS^i$), social welfare($SW$) and efficiency($\omega = \frac{SW - SW^{Free}}{SW^{FirstBest} - SW^{Free}}$).

In the first three cases, at most one operator charges tolls on both roads. When both roads are free of charge, a pooling equilibrium results both in the temporal sense as between the roads, since both groups require the same growth rate of the queue to be in equilibrium, and hence have no group-specific preferences of one used arrival moment over the other. There is therefore actually a continuum of equilibria at the group-route level, as long as the ratio of aggregate traffic to capacity is the same on both roads.

When a social planner charges link-specific tolls on both roads, social welfare increases by 10% compared to the free regime. Due to the higher price and the lower congestion on link 1, the h types travel on both links and the l types only travel on link 2. Consumer surplus decreases, but the increase in toll revenue more than compensates it. When a private operator sets tolls to maximise the joint toll revenue of both roads, the tolls are more than twice those in the public regime. A sharp drop in consumer surplus
leads to social welfare that is lower than in the free regime.

In the next two cases, link 1 is free but an operator can charge a toll on link 2. In the free-public regime, the increase in social welfare compared to the free regime is moderate, because only one third of the total road capacity is tolled. The consumer surplus is the second highest among all regimes. On the contrary, in the free-private regime, a private provider on link 2 decreases social welfare compared to the free regime. It is even worse than the monopoly regime, because the monopolist of both roads wants to reduce congestion on link 1 in order to raise total revenue, while the private operator on link 2 only cares about profit on link 2 and causes too much congestion on link 1. This result was also found in a static single-type setting (Verhoef et al. (1996)).

The last two cases show the effect of competition between two operators. We assume Nash behaviour between operators. When a public operator on link 2 competes with a private operator on link 1, the efficiency and consumer surplus are nearly as high as in the public regime. When two private operators compete, we can achieve 17% of the welfare gain we get from moving from the free regime to the first best regime (public pricing with queue-eliminating tolls). The private-private regime has even higher efficiency than the free-public regime, because the higher tolls greatly reduce congestion. On the other hand, the consumer surplus in the private-private regime is much less than in the free-public regime.

4.1.2 Flat Toll: Heterogeneity and Efficiency

What happens to the welfare effects of the regimes when the two groups become more different in terms of value of time and schedule delay value—in other words, as the degree of heterogeneity (defined as $\alpha_t$) increases? Figure 1 shows the result in terms of the relative efficiency.

\footnote{To make the results comparable when changing cost parameters, we also change the intercept of the inverse demand function, so as to keep the slope and the number of travellers at the free regime unchanged.}
The free regime has an efficiency of zero. The competing private-private regime does not have a Nash equilibrium for some parameters, due to a discontinuity in the pay-off function that arises when a marginal change in the toll leads to a switch between a fully separated equilibrium (each group uses one bottleneck exclusively) and a partially separated equilibrium (one group uses both bottlenecks, one group uses only one). So these two regimes are omitted (Appendix I). Figure 1 shows that for the remaining five regimes, the efficiency generally increases with the degree of heterogeneity. Similar as in Small and Yan (2001) with static congestion, when the two groups’ values of time and schedule delay become more different, product differentiation is more appreciated by both groups. In other words, h types prefer the link with a higher toll and lower congestion level, while l types prefer the link with a lower toll and higher congestion level. This increases the efficiency of free-private regime. However, we also find that the efficiency of private-public regime decreases over a certain range with the degree of heterogeneity, due to increasing local monopoly power. More specifically, as the groups become

\[ \frac{\alpha^H}{\alpha^L} \]

If a Nash equilibrium exists, its efficiency is bounded above by the private-public case.
more different, the optimal toll on link 2 has to be very high to correct for the congestion externality of the h group. This leaves the l group traveling on link 1, and subject to the monopoly power of the private supplier.

In addition, the efficiency does not change monotonically with the degree of heterogeneity, because there can be regime changes. When \( \frac{\alpha^h}{\alpha} = 1 \), both types are the same, so a pooling equilibrium results for all regimes. But as \( \frac{\alpha^h}{\alpha} \) increases, separating equilibrium starts to emerge, hence the kinks. For the monopoly case, a regime change happens again at \( \frac{\alpha^h}{\alpha} = 1.83 \), where the most profitable equilibrium changes from partial separating to full separating (see Appendix I). As a result, efficiency drops at that point because full separating equilibrium means more local monopoly power. Similar is true for public and private-public regimes. The free-public and free-private regime do not show efficiency decrease, because the free road offers relatively strong competition.

### 4.1.3 Flat Toll: Heterogeneity and Distributional Effects

Apart from social welfare concerns, policy makers and practitioners are also interested in the distributional effects of pricing, not in the least place because it has a strong impact on the social and political feasibility. A project is likely to meet resistance from travellers if they are made worse off. The percentage change in generalized price for both types are summarized in Figure 2 and Figure 3 respectively.
Figure 2: Flat Toll: Heterogeneity and Percentage Price Change (H Types)

Percentage change in generalized price \( \left( \frac{100(P^H - P^H_{free})}{P^H_{free}} \right) \), degree of heterogeneity \( \left( \frac{\alpha_H}{\alpha_L} \right) \)

Figure 3: Flat Toll: Heterogeneity and Percentage Price Change (L Types)

Percentage change in generalized price \( \left( \frac{100(P^L - P^L_{free})}{P^L_{free}} \right) \), degree of heterogeneity \( \left( \frac{\alpha_H}{\alpha_L} \right) \)
First of all, for both types all pricing regimes with a flat toll lead to a higher price. So all projects are likely to meet resistance from travellers unless the allocation of toll revenues convinces them otherwise. Secondly, as the degree of heterogeneity increases ($\frac{\alpha_h}{\alpha_l} > 3$ in the both figures), each link becomes more specialized in serving one group of travellers: $h$ types travel on link 2 and $l$ types travel on link 1. That is why the price for $h$ types is the same for the public, free-public and private-public regimes, and that for $l$ types is the same for the free-public and free-private regimes. As a result, the percentage price change for $h$ types increases with the degree of heterogeneity in the free-private regime, because the private operator on link 2 has increasingly more market power over $h$ types. Similarly, the percentage price change for $l$ types increases most significantly with monopoly and private-public regimes. And finally, the percentage change in generalized prices are mostly decreasing for $h$ types, but increasing for $l$ types. This is because the prices in free regime ($P_{free}^h$) increases for $h$ types but decreases for $l$ types when the degree of heterogeneity increases. We observe a kink for $h$ types in the free-public regime, because the increase in price in the free-public regime is smaller compared with that in the free regime between regime changes for $h$ types.

In sum, for the parameters used in the simulation for flat tolls, monopoly performs consistently worse than the free regime, while the free-private regime performs better than the free regime when the degree of heterogeneity is sufficiently high, due to the benefit of product differentiation. Private-public is better than free-regime, because of competition between the two links. However, the competition effect can be undermined by local monopoly power when the two types become so different that they travel on separate links. If the most efficient public regime is not available, the free-public regime is the best in terms of social welfare when heterogeneity is large and private-public regime is the best when heterogeneity is small so that the private operator has less market power. Finally, the generalized price for both types are lowest with the free regime.
4.2 Simulation: Queue Eliminating Toll

4.2.1 Queue Eliminating Toll: Base Equilibrium

We now turn to queue-eliminating time-varying tolling on both roads. Table 1 shows the equilibrium values of the key variables. In line with the theoretical discussion, we observe mostly pooling equilibria in a spatial sense, where both groups travel on both links. The free-public and free-private regimes have separating equilibrium, because link 1 is free and does not have a queue-eliminating toll component.

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<td>0.988</td>
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Toll ($\tau_j$), traffic flow ($N^j_i$), seller’s profit ($\Pi_j$), consumer surplus ($CS^i$), social welfare ($SW$) and the efficiency measure ($\omega = \frac{SW_{FirstBest} - SW_{Free}}{SW_{FirstBest}}$).

As a benchmark, the free regime is the same as with the flat toll. If both roads are tolled by a social planner, the increase in social welfare is 41%. This is because first queueing is eliminated, and second the users with higher schedule delay value now travel closer to the desired arrival time.
The consumer surplus is higher with queue-eliminating toll. If both roads are tolled by a monopolist, the social welfare is still higher than in the free regime, but consumer surplus naturally drops due to the private monopolist’s pricing behaviour.

The next two regimes concern cases where link 1 is free. When a public supplier on link 2 hands out a fixed time-independent subsidy to attract travellers similar to in Braid (1996), the consumer surpluses of both groups are higher, and the public supplier earns a positive return, so it is a Pareto improvement compared to the free regime. This differs from in the static model. When a private supplier charges a toll on link 2, the increase in social welfare is still positive but much smaller.

Both regimes with competition again perform quite well. The private-public and private-private regimes have a pooling equilibrium. Similar to the case of flat tolls, the social welfare of the private-private regime is higher than that of free-public regime, because congestion is greatly reduced due to having less travellers.

4.2.2 Queue Eliminating Toll: Heterogeneity and Efficiency

As the degree of heterogeneity increases, the ranking of the regimes in terms of social welfare remains the same, as is shown by Figure 4.
The free and public regimes have an efficiency of zero and one respectively, and the competing private-private regime does not have a Nash equilibrium for some parameters for the same reason as for flat tolls (see Appendix I), so these are omitted. For the remaining four regimes, the efficiency of queue-eliminating tolling increases with the degree of heterogeneity, because product differentiation is appreciated more by a more diverse population of travelers. The slopes appear somewhat flatter for private-public and monopoly regimes and steeper for free-public and free-private regimes. This is because the first two regimes have queue-eliminating toll on both roads and the degree of heterogeneity matters less. Unlike with flat tolls, both types travel on both links with queue-eliminating toll in the private-public regime, so there is enough competition between the two links to prevent the efficiency from dropping. The free-private regime is less efficient than monopoly, because the monopoly operator charges a much more efficient time-varying toll on link 1 (that remains untolled in the free-private regime). We still observe a kink for the free-private regime, because the equilibrium changes from pooling when

\footnote{If a Nash equilibrium exists, its efficiency is bounded above by the private-public case.}
the two groups are the same to separating when the degree of heterogeneity
increases, and the local monopoly power of link 2 increases. Overall, it seems
that the relative efficiency from different pricing regimes is rather robust, and
independent of the degree of heterogeneity. This has to do with the fact that
time-varying pricing always eliminate all delays on the priced roads. The re-
maining inefficiency due to mark-up pricing depends on demand elasticities,
is therefore largely independent on the degree of heterogeneity.

4.2.3 Queue Eliminating Toll: Heterogeneity and Distributional
Effects

The distributional effects for the different queue-eliminating regimes are sum-
marized in Figures 5 and 6.

Compared with flat tolls, the generalized prices with queue-eliminating
tolls are lower for all regimes, because queue-eliminating tolls are more effi-
cient. More travellers will therefore use the roads. This is in accordance with
Van den Berg (2012), who found for homogeneous users that a continues toll
is much better for users than a flat toll; and that for a toll with discrete steps
in it, the toll is better for users the more steps it has.
Figure 5: Queue-Eliminating Toll: Heterogeneity and Percentage Price Change (H Types)

Figure 6: Queue-Eliminating Toll: Heterogeneity and Percentage Price Change (L Types)
Similar to flat tolls, the percentage price change with queue-eliminating toll is in general decreasing for h types and increasing for l types. However, the percentage price change in the free-private regime is increasing for h types, because h types travel on link 2 only and are subject to the local monopoly power of the operator on link 2. Similarly, the percentage price changes increases most steeply in the monopoly regime for l types, because in other regimes with tolling on link 1, the operator is either public or faces competition from link 2. The free-public regime has in general lower prices for both types than the public regime, because link 2 offers a subsidy. However, there are kinks in the free-public regime for h types, which is caused again by a regime change. For example, at first when both types are the same, they travel on both roads. Then as the subsidy increases with the degree of heterogeneity, h types only travel on link 1 and l types on both roads. Finally as the subsidy increases further, all l types move to link 2 and h types travel on both links instead. In addition, the free-public regime generates a lower price than the free regime for both types, and public and private-public regime generate a lower price for h types.

In sum, for the parameters used in the simulation for queue-eliminating tolls, all regimes perform better in terms of social welfare than the free regime. The free-public regime also offers a higher consumer surplus for both types due to the flat subsidy it entails. Unlike in the flat toll case, the private-public regime remains more efficient than the free-public regime, even as the degree of heterogeneity increases, because the pooling equilibrium ensures relatively intense competition between the two links.

We have done robustness checks with respect to several supply and demand parameters: total capacity, capacity share of link 1 and elasticity of demand. The main conclusions just reported remain robust.
5 Conclusion

Our study shows that travellers become more different in values of time and of schedule delay, product differentiation offered by operators on parallel roads is more appreciated by both groups, but each operator might also have more local monopoly power. With flat tolls, separating equilibria are more likely to arise and competition softens, while with queue-eliminating toll, pooling equilibria are more commonly observed so that the competitive force remains relatively strong.

Under flat tolls, all our regimes raise the generalized price of both types compared to the no-toll regime. A constant toll does not remove the queuing, so travel costs and externalities remain high and this also implies a high toll. With a larger degree if heterogeneity, this is less so for the users with high value, while for the low types the price increase raises with the degree. Time-variant tolling leads to lower generalized price increases and for the high values often lowers prices.

So no matter the competition regime, time-variant tolling seems preferable over a flat toll scheme that does not removes queuing. A flat toll regime has a lower welfare gain, hurts road users more and is more susceptible to a local monopoly. It is important for policymakers to take heterogeneity into account in evaluating the efficiency of various road pricing policies, both in terms of social welfare and distributional effect. With parallel links, we have shown queue-eliminating tolls can induce more competition when multiple road operators are active in a network. If a flat toll is used, special care should be taken to make sure the reduced competition within the network does not become too harmful for social welfare.

There are at least two interesting and important extensions to our study. Firstly, we consider a discrete setting with only two types of users. This results in the non-existence of Nash equilibrium in some cases and separating equilibriums. When the heterogeneity follows a continuous distribution, the non-existence problem should be solved. However, the basic intuition still holds, with flat tolls each user type typically strictly prefers one link over the
other, while with queue-eliminating tolls all types use both roads. As a result, the implications for local monopoly power and competition would remain. Secondly, we only look at proportional heterogeneity, and for example not also ‘ratio heterogeneity’ between value of time and values of schedule delay or heterogeneity in the preferred arrival time. For queue-eliminating tolls, this is not restricting, as we have analytically shown that a pooling equilibrium is socially optimal for a general heterogeneity structure. For flat tolls, this can be seen as an extreme case, where a pooling equilibrium is never optimal. However, with more general structures, it remains intuitive that there will be parameter ranges where pooling equilibria are inferior to the separating ones. So the results obtained in this paper still applies to those cases.

Acknowledgements

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Appendix I Discontinuity

There are two types of separating equilibria: a fully separating equilibrium, where one group travels on one link and the other group on the other link; and a semi-separating equilibrium, where one group travels on one link, but the other group on both links. The optimal toll is different for these two equilibria. As a result, we have observed discontinuity in best response functions.

For a numerical example, consider a private supplier on link 1, who chooses \( \tau_1 \) to maximize its profit, given \( \tau_2 \) is around 8.229. If he charges a high toll, \( \tau_1 = 14.546 \), a full separating equilibrium results: \( h \) types will
travel on link 1 and l types on link 2. If he charges a lower toll, \( \tau_1 = 10.837 \), a semi-separating equilibrium results: h types will travel on link 1 but l types on both links. The optimal toll for the full separating equilibrium is different from the one for the semi-separating equilibrium, as shown in Table 3. So when \( \tau_2 \) changes from 8.228 to 8.230, the optimal \( \tau_1 \) jumps from 10.837 to 14.546.

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<th>( N^h_1 )</th>
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Figure 7 shows how profit on link 1 changes with \( \tau_1 \), given different \( \tau_2 \). When \( \tau_2 \) is small, i.e. \( \tau_2 = 0 \), it’s better to have full separating equilibrium, so the highest profit for operator 1 is achieved on the left part of the green dots. But when \( \tau_2 \) is large, i.e. \( \tau^2 = 15 \), it’s better to have semi-separating equilibrium, and the highest profit is achieved on the right part of the blue dots. The discontinuity arises when \( \tau^2 \) is some value in between, i.e. \( \tau^2 = 8.228 \), both left or right parts of the orange dots can generate the highest profit and a small change in \( \tau^2 \) will discontinuously change the optimal value of \( \tau^1 \). As a result, the best response function in toll is not continuous in the opponent’s toll, and sometimes a Nash equilibrium does not exist. It is likely that this feature disappears if the more realistic case of a continuous distribution were considered.
References


de Palma, A. and R. Lindsey (2002). Private roads, competition, and in-


