Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2010-09-02 Number: 10-090/2 Author-Name: Michael R. Baye Author-Workplace-Name: Indiana University Author-Name: Dan Kovenock Author-Workplace-Name: University of Iowa Author-Name: Casper G. de Vries Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam Title: The Herodotus Paradox Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Games and Economic Behavior', 74(1), 399-406.
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox". Classification-JEL: C72, D44 Keywords: second price, transfer to loser File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/10090.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 251523 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100090