Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2009-04-21 Number: 09-033/1 Author-Name: F.O.O. Wagener Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam Title: Shallow Lake Economics Run Deep: Nonlinear Aspects of an Economic-Ecological Interest Conflict Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in Computational Management Science, 2013, 10(4), 423-450.
Outcomes of the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical methods: the possible kinds of solutions are efficiently classified in bifurcation diagrams. Classification-JEL: C61, C73, Q57 Keywords: Shallow lake, optimal management, dynamic games, bifurcation analysis File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/09033.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 1726859 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090033