Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2006-02-14 Number: 06-018/3 Author-Name: Philip de Jong Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: Wilms & Goudriaan Public Economics BV, and Universiteit van Amsterdam Author-Name: Maarten Lindeboom Author-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, HEB, and Netspar Author-Name: Bas van der Klaauw Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, SCHOLAR Title: Screening Disability Insurance Applications Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Journal of the European Economic Association', 2011, 9(1), 106-29.
This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits. Classification-JEL: J28; J65 Keywords: disability insurance; sickness absenteeism; policy evaluation; self-screening; experiment File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/06018.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 190022 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060018