Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2005-12-06 Number: 05-109/4 Author-Name: Arijit Mukherjee Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: University of Nottingham and The Leverhulme Centre for Research in Globalisation and Economic Policy, UK Author-Name: Enrico Pennings Author-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Netherlands Title: Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'International Journal of Industrial Organization', 29(2), 232-41.
Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small. Classification-JEL: D43; L13; O34 Keywords: Licensing; downstream market; upstream market; innovation; welfare File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/05109.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 227956 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050109