Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2000-06-06 Number: 00-044/1 Author-Name: Jacob K. Goeree Author-Email: firstname.lastname@example.org Author-Workplace-Name: California Institute of Technology Author-Name: Theo Offerman Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: CREED, University of Amsterdam Title: Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values Abstract: See the article with the same title in the 'Economic Journal' (2003), 113, 598-614.
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.
This discussion paper has resulted in a publication in The Economic Journal, 2003, 113(489), 598-613. Classification-JEL: C72; D44 Keywords: Auctions; inefficiencies; information disclosure; competition File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/00044.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 357825 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000044