Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2000-02-14 Number: 00-011/1 Author-Name: Claudia Keser Author-Email: keser@VWL3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de Author-Workplace-Name: Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe Author-Name: Frans A.A.M. van Winden Author-Email: email@example.com Author-Workplace-Name: CREED, University of Amsterdam Title: Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Journal of Economics' 102(1) 23-39.
We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good thansubjects in the strangers condition. In thestrangers condition, contributions show a continual decay, while in the partnerscondition, contributions fluctuate on ahigh level until they decrease in the final periods. We interpret subjects'behavior in terms of conditional cooperationwhich is characterized by both future-oriented and reactive behavior. Classification-JEL: C92; H41 Keywords: Experimental Economics; Public Goods; Voluntary Contributions; Cooperation File-Url: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/00011.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 189785 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000011